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Our societal quest for collaboration and openness has always been in direct conflict with 
our desire to maintain our personal privacy.  Those conflicting goals are more prominent than 
ever for healthcare, due to its rapid Digital Transformation and coupled with risk related to the 
exploitation of Protected Health Information (PHI) that is processed on cloud-based 
technologies by healthcare Small and Midsize Businesses (SMB).  Healthcare SMBs are at higher 
risk because they often have limited resources to identify and assess risk.  This study focused on 
this issue through an exploratory inquiry using survey statistics, scholarly research, regulatory 
requirements, and best practices to develop a framework that can be used by healthcare SMBs to 
evaluate and select a risk assessment model.  As illustrated in this study, the selected model can 
be leveraged to identify and assess risk associated with PHI that is processed in the cloud.  This 
study included four key phases: confirmation of risk for PHI in the cloud, an investigation of 
HIPAA requirements and best practices for risk assessment, an evaluation of risk assessment 
models, and a risk assessment model selection process.  As a result, healthcare SMB entities with 
limited resources can improve their ability to achieve HIPAA compliance through risk 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Introduction to the Problem 
Over the past decade, the significance of computers as key enablers for achieving both 
strategic and tactical business objectives have dramatically increased at an accelerated pace.  As 
the world continues to undergo a digital transformation, several ongoing Information 
Technology (IT) trends supporting that transformation have been noted, including the Internet of 
Things (IoT), Predictive Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence (Newman, 2017).  The difference 
between recent and future IoT trends will be the dynamic and interactive convergence of IoT 
capabilities.  For example, IoT will move from its initial disparate deployment of smart devices 
to leveraging those devices across the Internet in highly integrated and automated ways. 
On an industrial level, IoT already includes such digitized capabilities as controlling 
utility resource allocation and consumption, the automation of entire supply chains, and self-
driving vehicles.  These capabilities have created an explosion of continuous IoT growth that the 
world has not previously seen.  As indicated in Figure 1, Cisco Systems projected that the 
number of connected IoT devices will exceed 50 billion by 2020 (Afshar, 2017), a more than 
100% increase from 2016.  This prediction reflects the growth rate of technology expressed by 
Moore’s Law and is based on the industry assumption that there was an inflection point near the 
year 2009, which is believed to mark the inception of IoT, when the number of devices on the 






Figure 1. IoT growth projections from Cisco Systems (Afshar, 2017; Cisco, 2013). 
 Since Cisco first made this prediction in 2013, other industry leaders––such as Gartner, 
Hewlett-Packard and International Data Corporation (ICD)––have published more conservative 
predictions that put IoT growth at 20-30 billion devices by 2020 (Gartner, Inc., 2015; IDC, 
2017).  To comprehend Cisco’s more extreme prediction of 50 billion devices, the purpose of 
this study, first, was to provide an understanding of the assumptions upon which this growth 
scenario is based.  Cisco and other industry experts have been clear that the actual number of 
devices on IoT by 2020 will be dependent upon some basic assumptions about usage patterns on 
the Internet going forward. Several IoT industry experts have clearly articulated these 
assumptions.  For example, Patterson (2017) explained that Internet infrastructure must be able 




further explained that IoT privacy and energy consumption issues would cause Cisco’s 
prediction to fall short. 
Maciej Kranz, Vice President of Strategic Innovation at Cisco Systems and a world-
recognized expert on IoT, has elaborated on the catalysts that must be in place to drive extreme 
IoT growth predictions.  In his Cisco blog, Kranz (2018) explained the necessary ingredients and 
conditions required to facilitate extreme IoT growth as follows: 
 Artificial Intelligence (AI) – AI and machine learning (ML) will enable predictive 
analysis of real-time IoT data streams to drive more powerful decision making and AI 
will facilitate much faster IoT device onboarding. 
 Fog or Edge Computing – In order for extreme IoT growth to be successful, real time 
data processing must occur on the “edge” of the network.  Fog or edge computing is 
making that possible by scaling cloud computing to the consumer’s network edge.  
 Blockchain will provide secure, audit-level tracking of IoT data transactions, eliminating 
the need for a central, trusted intermediary between communicating devices.  This is a 
basic requirement for highly regulated industries such as healthcare and finance (Krantz, 
2018). 
The capabilities that Kranz described (2018) are clearly at the forefront of industry discussion, 
proof of concept, innovation, and product development.  Given the focus on, and investment 
levels in, these capabilities, the assumption behind this study was that the prerequisites required 
to support extreme IoT growth were underway and that they supported the midpoint-to-higher 
end of the IoT growth prediction range.  Regardless of the final IoT count at the end of 2020, IoT 




rapid IoT growth is creating a hotbed for innovation, it is also presenting growing challenges for 
the protection of digital information. 
The vulnerability challenges that the world is facing on the Internet are not related to IoT 
growth alone.  More importantly, many “smart” devices on IoT are vulnerable, often because 
their platform footprint is too small to facilitate protective capabilities, or their default username 
and password is not changed at deployment (Symantec Security Response, 2016, pp. 1-2).  Those 
vulnerabilities are further exacerbated by product marketing organizations that push devices to 
the IoT market before device security can be considered.  Cybersecurity experts have been 
warning consumers over the past few years that hackers integrated into a network of bots that can 
execute denial of service attacks will compromise vulnerable IoT devices.  In 2016, the Mirai 
malware attack was one large body of evidence that this prediction had come to fruition.  On the 
heels of the Mirai attack, consumers were left asking what the probability is that a smart device 
on IoT will be attacked.  Cyber security company Symantec Corporation responded with an 
analysis concluding that most IoT devices are scanned by various cybercriminals approximately 
every two minutes.  This means that an unprotected IoT device, such as one with a default 
password, could be breached within minutes of going online (Symantec Security Response, 
2016). 
To further investigate and validate this research area, this study also considered theories 
about worldwide vulnerability rates.  A team of scholars from The University of Arizona studied 
an array of IoT device types to infer their vulnerability rates and the scale of worldwide 
vulnerabilities overall.  The vulnerability rates that they calculated included a broad variation 
that ranged from a low of 0.44% to a high of 40%, but the UA scholars argued that, given the 




lowest vulnerability rate of 0.44% would result in 4400 vulnerable systems for every million 
deployed” (Patton et al., 2014, pp. 4-6). 
Given the dramatic growth of vulnerable devices and data on the Internet, the information 
processed by all those devices has become and will continue to be widely varied in scope and to 
include massive amounts of proprietary information and personal data that must be protected.  
Individual Internet users are sharing virtually all their personal information: from complete 
financial portfolios and tax information to their full medical histories.  The diversity, distribution, 
value, and vulnerabilities that are characteristic of private personal information make it a prime 
target for exploitation by cybercriminals.  Ponemon Institute, a well-known U.S. research firm 
that is often quoted by major news agencies as a credible source, is dedicated to advancing 
responsible information and privacy management practices in business and government. To 
achieve this objective, the Institute conducts independent research, educates leaders from the 
private and public sectors, and verifies the privacy and data protection practices of organizations 
in a variety of industries.  Ponemon (2016) determined that since 2013, there has been a global 
increase of 29% in the total cost of data breaches.  The United States was the biggest contributor 
to this statistic, with a 9% increase ranging from $201 million spent in 2014 to $221 million in 
2016.  In their study, Ponemon (2016) noted that a data breach is a compromised record that 
includes information that identifies the natural person (individual) whose information has been 
lost or stolen. 
As depicted in Figure 2, the researchers who conducted the Ponemon study considered 
many factors of data breaches.  For example, the biggest global financial consequence of data 




an astounding 49%, paying the highest price, $3.97 million per incident, for lost business 
resulting from data breaches.  This figure was 50% higher than the next highest country. 
 
Figure 2. Ponemon Institute's global breach study highlights for 2016. 
In addition to increases in the cost of data breaches, a later Ponemon (2018) study found, 
between 2016 and 2018 there was a 26% probability of a material data breach involving 10,000 
lost or stolen records.  While data breaches caused by system glitches and human error were 
considered and found to be higher than expected, the primary cause of these breaches was 
malicious or criminal attacks, at 48% globally, with 52% of those global companies being U.S. 
owned. 
Because they are highly regulated, the healthcare and financial industries incur the 
highest indirect costs of data breaches in the U.S.  Within the U.S. Healthcare industry, many 
different organizations provide an array of services that require access to personal health 




increase factors related to data breaches more specific to U.S. healthcare organizations include 
proactive management of churn rate, notification to breach victims, and the time it takes to 
identify and contain a breach.  Churn rate is directly related to corporate campaigns that have a 
goal of reducing lost business by maintaining customer loyalty before a data breach occurs 
(Ponemon Institute, LLC, 2016).  These cost factors contribute to what is known as indirect 
costs, and these indirect costs have increased in the U.S. roughly 60% over the past 12 years. 
Background of the Study 
Healthcare-related personal information is at the core of all healthcare IT systems.  This 
information is also referred to as Protected Health Information (PHI).  The U.S. Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) defines PHI as demographic information, 
medical history, test and laboratory results, insurance information, and other data that a 
healthcare provider uses to identify a patient and determine appropriate care. PHI has been 
protected by law since the inception of HIPAA in 1996 (DHHS Office for Civil Rights, 2013).  
For this study, all the PHI transactions considered are electronic; therefore, all PHI discussed is 
referred to as Electronic Protected Health Information (ePHI). 
Systems that process ePHI transactions are spread throughout the healthcare ecosystem 
and are managed by a variety of stakeholders with varying degrees of discipline, capability, cost, 
and risk.  This study focused on the stakeholders within the healthcare ecosystem that are 
specifically related to patient care, referred to as the patient care ecosystem.  The patient care 
ecosystem is typically composed of one or more of the following: patients, healthcare providers, 
healthcare payers, pharmacy, business associates (includes ancillary service providers), and 




care and are, therefore, liable for compliance with HIPAA regulations are known as either 
covered entities or business associates that support these covered entities. 
Covered entities include anyone contributing to the patient care lifecycle, including 
healthcare insurance companies (payers), doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies (providers). 
 
Figure 3. Patient care ecosystem: patients, covered entities (healthcare providers, payers, 
pharmacy), business associates and cybercriminals. 
Business associates include those companies providing support for patient care, such as medical 
device companies, cloud providers, or any other organization or individual that performs services 
for a covered entity and has access to ePHI.  While undesirable, cybercrime is also a key 
component of the patient care ecosystem.  According to the U.S. Department of Homeland 




network.  For the purposes of this study, the scope of cybercrime was extended to include the 
Internet when it is used for processing ePHI to support patient care scenarios. 
The combination of covered entities and business associates required to provide patient 
care varies broadly and depends upon a patient’s specific medical issues and treatment.  While 
payer organizations are typically large and have significant resources available to protect ePHI, 
they also tend to be the most risk averse.  Small and Midsize Businesses (SMBs) run by private 
practice providers and their business associates, who are a variety of patient treatment delivery 
organizations (e.g., ancillary service providers such as medical device companies, transportation 
services, etc.) tend to have fewer resources with which to protect ePHI.  Throughout this study, 
U.S. Healthcare Small and Midsized Business Covered Entities and Business Associates 
(SMBE&A) refer collectively to U.S. Healthcare Small and Midsized Business Covered Entities 
and Business Associates.  SMBE&A further defines SMB to healthcare industry as related to 
HIPAA requirements for covered entities and business associates. 
For several years, industry experts have valued ePHI records to be worth at least ten 
times more than a person’s credit card information on the black market (Humer & Finkle, 2014, 
p. 1).  Jackson (2014) substantiated this claim by stating, 
Stolen health credentials can go for $10 each, about 10 or 20 times the value of a U.S. 
credit card number, according to Don Jackson, Director of Threat Intelligence at 
PhishLabs, a cybercrime protection company.  Mr. Jackson obtained the data by 
monitoring underground exchanges where hackers sell the information. (pp. 1-2) 
ePHI has such a high bounty for cybercriminals because these data include patient names and 
their birthdates, insurance policy numbers, diagnostic codes, and medical billing information.  




The variety of patient data protection capabilities that exists between covered entities and 
business associates often makes for challenging business partnerships that can create additional 
risk as well as a more frustrating healthcare experience for patients.  These variables, along with 
the mass movement of healthcare information to various cloud-based hosting and application 
deployment models and the desire to support full digitization of the healthcare ecosystem, make 
ePHI a prime target for cybercriminals.  For example, according to healthcare IT security firm 
Redspin, over 100 million ePHI records have been stolen in a HIPAA data breach since 2009.  
These data breaches have taken place within numerous recognizable healthcare brands, such as 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee (with 1 million victims), TRICARE Management Activity 
with (4.9 million victims), and the highly publicized breach in 2015 at Anthem with (80 million 
victims) (JA, 2015). 
If larger healthcare companies with strong financial resources are at risk, it is not difficult 
to infer that healthcare SMB organizations are likely at even greater risk of being breached and 
their ePHI being compromised. Timothy Francis, an enterprise leader for the cyber insurance 
product line at Travelers Insurance, in a 2105 panel discussion, noted that although most cyber 
breach headlines are from larger corporate institutions, SMB breaches are far greater in number.  
The 2015 panel highlighted that 62% of cyber breach victims are SMB, further noting that most 
SMB preparation for breaches is low and that the costs of customer notification alone can be 
financially irreparable (Donlon, 2015). 
To better understand the breadth and depth of this problem for SMB’s, this study 
considered data from The U.S. Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration, which 
defines small business as independent companies that have 1-499 employees (Donlon, 2015).  




businesses are victims of cyber-breach, as Francis (cited in Donlon, 2015) suggest, given a 
criminal preference for healthcare patient data, this is a major problem for SMB healthcare 
companies, and further research into mitigation is firmly justified. 
ePHI is deliberately targeted when it is hosted or processed on cloud-based assets.  
SMBE&A organizations are concerned most about ePHI data when it is in transit (as it moves 
from point-to-point across the Internet) and at rest (when digital copies of ePHI are hosted on 
various systems, storage, multi-tenant environments, etc.).  Essentially, any ePHI being hosted or 
processed on IT assets that are not under the control of the SMBE&A is a concern for that 
population.  With the goals of reducing stakeholder risk and improving patient confidence that 
their ePHI is being protected when managed by SMBE&A on the Internet and through cloud-
based IT assets, this research study sought to address healthcare stakeholder concerns by 
discussing and offering risk management model options and best practices. 
The researcher for this study has over 30 years of experience in the field of Information 
Technology, which includes 20 years in various healthcare IT roles, and, thus, is a key research 
instrument within this study.   As Chief Information Officer at an SMB healthcare technology 
company that relies significantly on external integration with dozens of covered entities and 
business associates to process patient data across disparate cloud assets, the researcher brings a 
unique perspective and rich experience (Sulem, 2017, pp. 1-2). 
Problem Statement 
This study focused on the need to identify, assess, and reduce risk associated with the 
protection of ePHI while it is being processed in the cloud by SMBE&A, and to do so in a way 
that is HIPAA compliant.  More specifically, this study sought to identify what research has been 




vulnerabilities so that HIPAA compliance can be achieved.  The healthcare scenario studied for 
this research effort was a simple patient care scenario (Figure 3) that leverages various cloud-
based resources owned or operated by a variety of healthcare-covered entities and business 
associates.  While larger healthcare payer and provider organizations tend to have an abundance 
of resources at their disposal, SMBE&A often do not.  This makes these smaller healthcare 
organizations more susceptible to ePHI vulnerabilities.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this exploratory inquiry is to help SMBE&A to choose an appropriate risk 
assessment model that is low cost, easy to implement, and that can be used to determine the level 
of risk for ePHI as it is processed through cloud-based systems.  This study contributes to that 
purpose by providing research on the following: 
(1) Identification of the likelihood and impacts of risk associated with SMBE&A that 
process cloud-based ePHI transactions while participating in patient care (Figure 3).  
Then, using that information, considering best-fit risk assessment models and 
capabilities for the SMBE&A population. 
(2) Discovery of shortfalls related to existing healthcare risk-centric research by 
addressing gaps that center around the evaluation and selection of risk assessment 
models and capabilities for SMBE&A. 
(3) Research and added value for SMBE&A that have limited amounts of the resources 
required to select and leverage risk assessment capabilities to evaluate the risk levels 




As a result, the SMBE&A population can increase its ability to achieve HIPAA compliance, 
remain in business by providing an appropriate level of protection for ePHI, and improve the 
overall patient care experience. 
Research Questions 
As described throughout this study’s background, purpose, and literature review chapters, 
SMBs in the U.S. healthcare industry are at risk of HIPAA data (ePHI) breaches.  Therefore, 
they require the ability to select and leverage an appropriate risk assessment model when ePHI is 
processed within cloud-based systems.  To define and support the research required for this 
study, a research design that considered both qualitative and quantitative information was used.  
The areas of focus for this design are presented here as the research questions (RQ) that were 
used for this study: 
RQ1:  Does the risk of an ePHI breach justify the need to leverage a viable risk 
assessment model for the SMBE&A population? 
RQ2:  Through evaluation and assessment of HIPAA regulatory requirements and 
impacted IT architecture, what are the current risk factors for risk assessment that are 
critical for the SMBE&A population? 
RQ3:  Through evaluation and assessment of current risk models that meet HIPAA risk 
factor needs, what are candidate models for the SMBE&A population? 
RQ4:  What selection decision capability can be used by the SMBE&A population to 
evaluate and select an appropriate risk assessment model and how can the chosen model 




Method and Approach 
This study proceeded in four key phases: (a) Confirmation of ePHI Breach Risk; (b) 
Decomposition of HIPAA Requirements for ePHI and Impacted Cloud-based Technology; (c) 
Evaluation of Risk Assessment Models; and (d) Risk Assessment Model Selection Process. 
1. Phase One - Confirmation of ePHI Breach Risk:  In phase one of the study, the 
background, problem, and purpose were researched and presented to confirm that 
ePHI is at risk when processed in the cloud.  The finding of phase one was that 
further research is required for the SMBE&A population regarding the need to assess 
risk levels for ePHI being processed on cloud-based systems.  In the initial part of 
phase one, risk impacts related to rapid IoT growth and related vulnerabilities were 
first considered.  Phase one continued with qualitative research supported by surveys 
that assessed the impact on global companies from breaches of personal information.  
The research was then refined to focus specifically on ePHI breaches within the U.S. 
healthcare industry.  The impact of ePHI breaches was then quantified with data 
retrieved from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) Office 
of Civil Rights (OCR) to validate the assumption that ePHI is truly at risk and that 
these breaches result in HIPAA violations, financial problems, and other negative 
outcomes for the impacted healthcare stakeholders.   
2. Phase Two - Decomposition of HIPAA Requirements for ePHI and Impacted Cloud-
based Technology:  The second phase of this study began with a comprehensive 
decomposition of HIPAA requirements for ePHI to provide a clear picture for what 
constitutes an ePHI vulnerability that is out of compliance with HIPAA requirements.  




management best practices published by NIST to understanding HIPAA risk 
assessment requirements.  Criteria were developed to evaluate various risk 
assessment and analysis models that can be leveraged to assign risk levels at various 
integration points across a given patient care scenario.  For selecting the technical 
areas of high risk to be considered in the chosen risk assessment model, phase two 
concluded with a decomposition of the characteristics of cloud computing and a 
layered protective architecture model that helps create transparency in areas that are 
likely at high risk of SMBE&A breaches when ePHI transactions are processed in the 
cloud. 
3. Phase Three - Evaluation of Risk Assessment Models:  Phase three used the HIPAA, 
NIST, and NSA Defense in Depth (DiD) requirements identified in phase two to 
develop risk analysis and management steps based on key risk factors that were 
considered to create selection criteria for the risk assessment models.  Phase three 
concluded with research on three different risk assessment methodologies that 
included probable alignment with the defined selection criteria. 
4. Phase Four - Risk Assessment Model Selection Process:  Phase four first considered 
research on selection decision models and processes that can be used to support the 
process of selection for risk assessment models applied to the SMBE&A population.  
After the selection of a decision matrix model, phase four then applied the selection 
criteria defined in phases two and three to the chosen decision matrix model and used 
that populated model to evaluate and rate each of the risk assessment models 
identified in phase three.  The risk assessment model evaluated with the highest rating 




assessment model that provided a practical example of how the chosen model can be 
used by the SMBE&A population.  Gaps and future research opportunities were also 
identified and discussed. 
Significance of the Study 
For several years, security experts have warned that cybercriminals are increasingly 
targeting the $4 trillion (as of 2017) U.S. healthcare industry.  The primary reason for this is that 
stolen ePHI can sell for $10 per record, approximately ten to twenty times the street value of a 
U.S. credit card number (Humer & Finkle, 2014).  In their cost of data breaches study, the 
Ponemon Institute (2016) found that between 2016 and 2018, there was a 26% probability that at 
least 10,000 lost or stolen records would be involved in each material breach.  In the U.S. 
healthcare industry, the largest fiscal impact from data breaches is associated with lost business:  
“The cost component of lost business includes the abnormal turnover of customers, increased 
customer acquisition activities, reputation losses, and diminished goodwill” (Ponemon Institute, 
LLC, 2016, pp. 5-6) as well as lost business related to HIPAA law enforcement and penalties. 
 Healthcare stakeholders impacted most by these losses are SMBE&A, as defined in 
HIPAA regulations.  Stakeholders that contribute to patient care include broad variation in terms 
of their ability to mitigate risks associated with breaches of patient data.  For example, payer 
organizations (healthcare insurance companies) are typically larger and have more resources 
available to protect ePHI than SMBs run by private practice providers (doctors, clinics, etc.) and 
their business associates, which include a variety of treatment delivery organizations (e.g., online 
discount pharmaceutical suppliers, medical device companies, etc.), tend to have fewer resources 




The significance of this study is that it directly contributes to the awareness and possible 
mitigation of risks associated with SMBE&A that are at high-risk of patient data breaches. The 
individuals and companies that can benefit most from this study include SMB healthcare 
organizations that contribute to patient care and process patient data and the patients being 
treated.  Specifically, the first line of defense for healthcare stakeholders are companies’ IT 
Security managers and professionals.  This study helps to equip those teams and individuals with 
the ability to quickly, easily, and cost effectively evaluate and select a risk assessment model that 
assists them to identify and assess high-risk scenarios, including vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited by cybercriminals and result in a breach of ePHI.  The benefits include the reduction of 
patient frustration, the reduction of costs to SMBE&A that result from data breaches, the 
reduction of overall healthcare costs, the reduction of overall healthcare stakeholder risk 
aversion, and the protection of patient data. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
The survey data researched, referenced, and used for this study provide strong evidence 
that ePHI has a high probability of data breach when processed by SMB healthcare stakeholders 
on cloud-based assets.  While this study does include research around data breach as it pertains 
to the impacts of HIPAA compliance, it did not cover other data breach concerns, other 
industries, or the entire healthcare patient ecosystem, however.  Rather, this study was 
specifically focused on simple patient care scenarios that involve an insurance company, a 
healthcare provider (a private practice for general family medicine), an online pharmacy delivery 
company, and associated technology providers. 
The HIPAA Security Rule Crosswalk to NIST Cybersecurity Framework was used in this 




cybersecurity risks in a way that is aligned with HIPAA Security Rule requirements.  While the 
entire crosswalk table and its contents should be considered when planning a company’s 
Enterprise Information Security Program and protective measures for the HIPAA Security Rule, 
this research study focused only on the crosswalk categories and subcategories (as listed at Table 
1 and further refined at Table 5) that directly impact the privacy and integrity of patient 
information as it moves, across the Internet, through and between covered healthcare entities and 
their business associates. 
The risk assessments conducted for the purposes of this study were limited to SMBE&A.  
The critical selection criteria for an appropriate risk assessment model were that the model 
should be easy to use, low cost, and include flexibility that aligns with HIPAA requirements.  As 
a result, the target users for this study are SMB healthcare stakeholders that process ePHI with 
cloud-based systems and networks.  Therefore, the scope for this study was limited to finding a 
framework that healthcare SMB organizations can leverage that includes selection criterion and a 
selection process for risk assessment models based on HIPAA compliance requirements. 
 Development of a comprehensive risk management plan and maintaining security 
measures were outside the scope of this study.  Because this study is focused on the evaluation 
and selection of a risk assessment model and method, the implementation of risk mitigation 
solutions was also not considered in scope of this study.  Other technology areas that were out of 
scope for this study included: data backup and recovery, high availability, disaster recovery, 
network traffic flow control, intrusion detection systems, data loss prevention, enclave boundary 
defense, API management, GDPR, and Blockchain.  Technologies that are in scope and related 
to protection of data at-rest and in-transit, are in Chapter 2 at the section titled “Layered 




Definition of Terms 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) – (a) A facet of computer science that addresses computers 
developed to simulate intelligent behavior (b) when intelligent human behavior can be emulated 
by a machine (Merriam-Webster, 2108). 
Blockchain – Technology that leverages cryptocurrency to create and facilitate peer-to-
peer payment and ledger capabilities that are considered highly secure from breach.  Bitcoin and 
a blockchain ledger work together to create this capability (Pemberton-Levy, 2016). 
Business Associates - Ancillary support for patient care, such as medical device 
companies or any other organization or individual that performs services for a covered entity and 
has access to ePHI (Office for Civil Rights [OCR], 2003). 
Cloud Computing - Model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction (Mell & Grance, 2011). 
Covered Entities - Specific HIPAA terminology, like “Healthcare Stakeholders,” that 
includes anyone contributing to the patient care lifecycle, such as healthcare insurance 
companies (payers), doctors (providers), hospitals, and pharmacies (DHHS Office for Civil 
Rights, 2017). 
Data Breach - Event in which an individual’s name plus a medical record and/or a 
financial record or debit card is potentially put at risk, with a compromised record being defined 
as information that identifies the natural person (individual) whose information has been lost or 




Defense in Depth (DiD) – The Information Assurance Department (IAD) of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) defines DiD as a practical strategy for achieving Information Assurance 
in today’s highly networked environments.  DiD strategy is dependent upon on the intelligent 
application of currently available techniques and technologies (National Security Agency, 2015). 
Digital Transformation - Use of technology to radically improve the performance or 
reach of enterprises.  Executives in all industries are using digital advances such as analytics, 
mobility, social media, and smart embedded devices, as well as improving their use of traditional 
technologies such as ERP, to change their customer relationships, internal processes, and value 
propositions (Westerman, Bonnet, & McAfee, 2014). 
Electronic Data Exchange (EDI) – Computer-to-computer transfer of business 
transaction information using standard, industry-accepted message formats (EDI Basics, 2018). 
Electronic Health Record (EHR) - Patient data associated with a specific individual 
(including PHI) that can span multiple healthcare providers (Robichau, 2014). 
Electronic Medical Record (EMR) - System used by a healthcare provider to manage 
the care of patients (Robichau, 2014). 
Explanation of Benefits (EOB) - Insurance companies’ written explanations regarding a 
claim showing what they paid and what the patient must pay (HealthInsurance.org, 2018). 
Electronic Protected Health Information (ePHI) - PHI that is in electronic format 
(Jones, 2014). 
Fog Computing – Also known as “edge computing,” fog computing extends the cloud to 
make it in closer proximity to devices and systems that create and act on IoT data.  Fog nodes 




performance latency that can be experienced with a typical cloud connection (Cisco Systems, 
Inc., 2015). 
Healthcare Stakeholders - Entities that participate in the patient care lifecycle, including 
insurance companies (payers), doctors, hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, medical device companies, 
etc. (Robichau, 2014). 
HIPAA - Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) was 
federal legislation designed to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of the national 
healthcare system by standardizing electronic healthcare transactions and identifiers. It also 
established safeguards to protect patient privacy and to ensure that patient data were secured and 
treated with respect and confidentiality (Office for Civil Rights [OCR], 2003). 
HIPAA Claim Payment Transaction (Claim Payment) - HIPAA EDI Transaction 
(835) used to make a payment, send an Explanation of Benefits (EOB) remittance advice, or 
make a payment and send EOB remittance advice only between a health insurer and a health care 
provider either directly or via a financial institution (EDI Basics, 2018). 
HIPAA Claim Submit Transaction (Claim Submit) - HIPAA EDI Transaction Claim 
Submit (837) used to submit a health care claim billing information, encounter information, or 
both, except for retail pharmacy claims (see EDI Retail Pharmacy Claim Transaction). It can be 
sent from the providers of health care services to payers either directly or via intermediary billers 
and claims clearinghouses (EDI Basics, 2018). 
HIPAA Eligibility Inquiry Transaction (Eligibility Inquiry) - HIPAA EDI 
Transaction (270) used to inquire about the health care benefits and eligibility associated with an 




HIPAA Eligibility Response Transaction (Eligibility Response) - HIPAA EDI 
Transaction (271) used to respond to an inquiry about the health care benefits and eligibility 
associated with an insurance subscriber or subscriber dependent (EDI Basics, 2018). 
HIPAA EDI Transaction Standards - HIPAA EDI Transaction Standards, a key 
component of HIPAA, establish national standards for electronic health care transactions and 
national identifiers for providers, health insurance plans, and employers (EDI Basics, 2018). 
HIPAA Privacy Rule - Standards for the privacy of individually-identifiable health 
information (“Privacy Rule”) that established a set of national standards for the protection of 
certain health information. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) issued 
the Privacy Rule to implement the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2013). 
HIPAA Security Rule - Requires health care providers, health plans, and business 
associates to conduct risk analyses and implement technical, physical, and administrative 
safeguards for ePHI (Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology 
[ONC], DHHS Office for Civil Rights [OCR], & DHHS Office of the General Counsel [OGC], 
2017). 
Internet of Things (IoT) - Intel defines the Internet of Things (IoT) as a “robust network 
of devices, all embedded with electronics, software, and sensors that enable them to exchange 
and analyze data” (Intel, Inc., 2016, p. 3).  However, many scholars and industry experts argued, 
at an NIST-sponsored academic seminar, that any set definition of IoT would be too limiting in a 
rapidly evolving field.  In the same NIST workshop proceedings, researchers agreed that IoT is 
“a means to connect purpose-built items that leverage communication sensors to bridge the 




Protected Health Information (PHI) - Generally refers to demographic information, 
medical history, test and laboratory results, insurance information, and other data that a 
healthcare provider uses to identify a patient and determine appropriate care (Office for Civil 
Rights [OCR], 2003). 
Risk Analysis - Synonymous with Risk Assessment (NIST: Joint Task Force for 
Transformation Inititative, 2012). 
Risk Assessment - Component of Risk Management that identifies (a) threats to the 
organization or threats directed through organizations against other organizations or the Nation, 
(b) vulnerabilities internal and external to organizations, (c) the harm that may occur given the 
potential for threats exploiting vulnerabilities, and (d) the likelihood that harm will occur.  The 
result is a determination of risk (level of risk and degree of harm) (NIST: Joint Task Force for 
Transformation Inititative, 2012). 
Risk Factor - Characteristic used in a risk model as an input to determine the severity of 
risk in a risk assessment (NIST: Joint Task Force for Transformation Inititative, 2012). 
Risk Management - Process of identifying risk, assessing risk, and taking steps to 
reduce risk to an acceptable level (NIST: Joint Task Force for Transformation Inititative, 2012). 
Small and Midsize Business (SMB) - In the context of IT, Gartner defines an SMB as a 
business that, due to its size, has different IT requirements—and often faces different IT 
challenges—than large enterprises and whose IT resources (usually budget and staff) are often 
highly constrained (Gartner, Inc., 2018). 
Organization of Thesis 
This study was designed to support the assertion that processing healthcare transactions 




exploited by cybercriminals.  Research and findings on several subjects that support this 
assertion were revealed.  For example, evidence was presented from research on Internet 
vulnerabilities and HIPAA compliance concerns that support the existence of ePHI risk levels 
when health care data are hosted in the cloud.  This study defined criteria that were used to 
evaluate various risk assessment and analysis models that can be leveraged to assign risk levels 
at various integration points across a given patient care scenario.  The chosen selection criteria 
were then used to evaluate and select a risk assessment model that aligns well with the needs of 
SMB healthcare companies that process ePHI in the cloud. 
Chapter 2 describes existing scholarly and industry research related to this topic with the 
goal of determining what is known and is not known about the topic. Chapter 3 examines how 
the research questions were addressed and describes the research design approaches used for this 
study: a pragmatic point of view, a primarily qualitative design that includes quantified 
information and a data collection method and data analysis practices utilized to support the 
research questions presented in Chapter 1.  In Chapter 4, the findings of the analysis and a 
summary of the results are presented.  Finally, Chapter 5 contains an interpretation of the results 
from Chapter 4, the study’s conclusions based on the findings, and a discussion of this research 
as well as recommendations for future research. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This literature review chapter illustrates how knowledge has been built up in the 
combined research fields of IoT and healthcare. It also examines HIPAA requirements, 
vulnerabilities associated with ePHI hosted in the cloud, risks associated with SMBE&A, risk 
assessment models that assist with identification and evaluation of vulnerabilities for ePHI, and 
selection criteria based on HIPAA requirements that can be used to select an appropriate risk 
assessment model and methodology.  This research is intended for use by SMBE&A 
organizations that seek to identify and reduce risks associated with processing ePHI in the cloud.  
The research for this literature review addresses Research Areas (RA) 1-4 to provide data 
relevant to research questions (RQ) 1-4 defined in Chapter 1, as follows: 
 RA1 – Research presented in chapters 1 and 2 regarding Internet growth and related 
vulnerabilities justifies the need to leverage an appropriate risk assessment model for 
SMBE&A. 
 RA2 – Research presented in Chapter 2 regarding HIPAA regulatory requirements 
and enforcement, along with guidance from NIST and NSA (DiD), identifies related 
characteristics and risk factors later used in this study to evaluate, select, and utilize 
an appropriate risk assessment model for the SMBE&A population. 
 RA3 – Research presented in Chapter 2 identifies and evaluates risk assessment 
models that are likely selection candidates for the SMBE&A population. 
 RA4 – The research presented in Chapter 2 identifies an effective decision matrix 
process used in this study to evaluate and select a risk assessment model appropriate 




By demonstrating the achievements but also the limitations of previous research, this chapter 
presents a justification for the research to be undertaken. 
HIPAA and its Enforcement with Privacy Rule and HITECH 
The protection of patient healthcare information has been a long-standing problem with 
many complex legal implications.  In the United States, patient information is protected by the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, also known as HIPAA.  HIPAA 
was enacted by the U.S. Congress and signed by President Clinton with the goal of protecting 
patient privacy and helping to ensure insurance coverage for individuals with pre-existing 
conditions.  Because of HIPAA, healthcare payers, providers, and business associates are 
required to ensure the privacy and confidentiality of all patients’ medical and billing records. 
To guide the enforcement of HIPAA, The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 
(DHHS) (2013) implemented the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which states,  
The Privacy Rule standards address the use and disclosure of individuals’ health 
information—called “protected health information” by organizations subject to the 
Privacy Rule—called “covered entities,” as well as standards for individuals' privacy 
rights to understand and control how their health information is used.   
A department within DHHS known as the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has been assigned 
accountability for the enforcement of compliance and financial penalties for non-compliance 
with the Privacy Rule. 
The costs of HIPAA violations include both civil and criminal violations and penalties.  
When a covered entity is found to be noncompliant with HIPAA and does not satisfactorily 
resolve the matter, OCR will decide whether to impose Civil Money Penalties (CMPs) on the 




cases range between $100-$50,000 per violation and a maximum of $1.5 million per year.  
Covered entities that commit criminal violations of HIPAA are addressed by the Department of 
Justice.  As with HIPAA civil penalties, there are a variety of levels of severity for criminal 
violations for noncompliance (American Medical Association, 2018).  Depending on the severity 
of the violation, criminal penalties can range from a $50,000 fine and one year of jail time to 
$250,000 fines and ten years of imprisonment.  
Figure 4 illustrates the OCR HIPAA violation settlements that occurred in between the 
years 2015-2018; the overall downward trend in settlements for this period suggests that 
healthcare companies are taking corrective action before a financial penalty is imposed on them 
or a settlement is agreed to (Compliancy Group, 2018).  This study also highlights the fact that if 
2018 continues its current annual trend in settlements, the year would end at ~$27M in 
settlements, resulting in a shift back to an upward trend.  The number of all HIPAA violation 
cases currently under investigation is much larger.  A comprehensive report for all active 
investigations can be located on the OCR website at their “Breach Portal,” also known as their 





Figure 4. Annual HIPAA financial settlements. 
The Breach Portal is highly interactive and, through a few search filters, quickly reveals 
evidence supporting the assertion that ePHI is at an elevated risk of a cyber-breach.  For 
example, in 2017 alone, OCR investigated 123 covered entities or business associates for HIPAA 
violations.  The total number of individuals potentially affected across all reported parties was 
3.1 million.  Figure 5 shows a distribution of affected individuals by breached IT asset.  When 
compared with the data in Figure 4, most breach costs appear associated with corrective 






Figure 5. Breach cases under investigation by OCR, 2017. 
 Further, the 70% figure for individuals affected by breaches of ePHI resulted from 
vulnerabilities associated with network-based server infrastructures (DHHS Office for Civil 
Rights [OCR], 2018). 
This study considered the cost of data breaches (as discussed in Chapter 1). Combined 
with the business impacts from data breaches in healthcare, that aggregate data revealed several 
keys points as described in Figure 6.  The following themes emerge from these combined data 
sets: 
 On a global level, the U.S. incurs the highest annual cost from data breaches compared to 




 The U.S. healthcare industry is the largest contributor to the cost of data breaches in the 
U.S.  Regulatory requirements and “cyber bounty” for ePHI are the key drivers of this 
cost. 
 With 99% of U.S. companies being SMB, 62% of those SMBs being data breach victims 
in recent years, and 20% of those SMB breach victims being healthcare entities that 
contribute to the high number of U.S. citizens who have had their ePHI breached, there is 
serious cause for concern about ePHI becoming compromised. 
 
Figure 6. Summary of costs and impacts for data breaches. 
A primary goal of the Privacy Rule is to ensure that ePHI is protected from compromise 
and, at the same time, allows for the continuous flow of patient health information required to 
promote patient care and wellness (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2013).  Healthcare 
stakeholders covered by the Privacy Rule include Health Insurance Plans (also known as 




Health Care Providers (also known as “providers,” or individuals and entities that provide care or 
treatment to patients), Health Care Clearinghouses (entities that process nonstandard information 
that they receive in a standard format from another entity), and various business associates that 
support the aforementioned covered entities.  These healthcare stakeholders are all accountable 
for compliance with the Privacy Rule. 
Patient information protected by the Privacy Rule is known as Protected Health 
Information (PHI).  The Privacy Rule ensures that all individually identifiable health information 
is protected as it flows through and between healthcare stakeholders (i.e., covered entities and 
business associates).  A simple example of this information flow can be illustrated with the 
transaction lifecycle of a patient who is prescribed medication by a provider: The prescription is 
processed and delivered by an online pharmacy and payment for it is processed by the patient’s 
insurance company (payer).  Key components of this transaction lifecycle are depicted in Figure 
7 and include HIPAA Electronic Data Exchange (EDI) Transaction Standards, such as the 
following: 
 Explanation of Benefits (EOB); 
 HIPAA Claim Payment Transaction (Claim Payment / 835); 
 HIPAA Claim Submit Transaction (Claim Submit / 837); 
 HIPAA Eligibility Inquiry Transaction (Eligibility Inquiry / 270); 
 HIPAA Eligibility Response Transaction (Eligibility Response / 271); and 
 Explanation of Benefits (EOB). 
The Privacy Rule refers to this information as PHI.  The scope of PHI includes all patient 
demographic data that discloses any of the following information: 




 the provision of health care to the individual; or 
 the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to the individual 
that identifies the individual or reasonably can be believed to identify the individual.  
Individually identifiable health information includes many common identifiers (e.g., 
name, address, birth date, Social Security Number).  PHI included in the patient 
medical history is referred to as an Electronic Health Record (EHR).  Therefore, an 
EHR is also protected by the Privacy Rule.  The entire Privacy Rule is located at the 
OCR website (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2013). 
 
Figure 7. Patient care ecosystem with HIPAA EDI transactions. 
While HIPAA and the HIPAA Privacy Rule provide a solid foundation for understanding 




the “why”), it does not address protective measures (the “how”) that are specifically related to 
the electronic transmission of digital patient health information.  To connect the “what” and 
“why” with the “how,” The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act was signed into law in 2009.  “Subtitle D of the HITECH Act addresses the 
privacy and security concerns associated with the electronic transmission of health information, 
in part, through several provisions that strengthen the civil and criminal enforcement of the 
HIPAA rules” (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2017). 
In conjunction with HITECH, the OCR has established a close relationship with the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop a crosswalk that maps NIST 
Cybersecurity best practices to HIPAA’s Privacy and Security Rules. The primary goal of the 
crosswalk was “ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected 
health information (ePHI) that covered healthcare entities and their business associates create, 
receive, maintain, or transmit” (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2017).  The NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework Core includes five integrated functions that create a management continuum to 
address an organization’s cybersecurity risk.  The OCR and NIST teams collaborated to map 
each ePHI protection standard and implementation approach in the HIPAA Security Rule on to a 
related NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategory (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2016). 
While the entire crosswalk table and its contents should be considered when planning a 
company’s Enterprise Information Security Program and its alignment to the HIPAA Security 
Rule, this research study focused only on those crosswalk categories and subcategories that 
directly impacted the privacy and integrity of patient information as it moves from point to point 
across the Internet through and between covered healthcare entities and their business associates.  




represented as primary (critical for this study) and secondary (supporting focus area) “areas of 
relative importance” as related to the protection of patient information.  These in-scope focus 
areas span all five of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Core Functions: Identify, Protect, 
Detect, Respond, and Recover.  The crosswalk categories and subcategories critical for this 
research study were those that are directly related to the protection of ePHI when being accessed 
or processed, whether at rest or in transit.  Those critical categories are the following: 
 understanding the roles and responsibilities of all covered entities and business associates 
that process or host ePHI (ID.AM-6 and ID.BE-1); 
 understanding data flows throughout the ePHI transaction lifecycle (ID.AM-3); 
 management of information and data access controls (PR.AC [1,3,4]); 
 implementing an appropriate level of data security (PR.DS [1-7]); and 
 the establishment and use of a comprehensive risk assessment framework (ID.RA [1-6]). 
Subsequent sections of this literature review explore these focus areas in more detail with the 
goal of continuing to refine the crosswalk towards the minimum necessary categories needed for 




Table 1. OCR/NIST crosswalk table (excerpt related to ePHI, only). 
 
Digital Healthcare Information in the Cloud 
As previously mentioned, covered healthcare entities and their business associates are 
continually challenged to extend their use of cloud computing to improve system integration 
between them and to help facilitate standardized and safe patient data exchange throughout that 
patient’s medical lifecycle.  With an emphasis on the concept of safety, the next section focuses 
on key points of probable vulnerability for patient data as it moves through the cloud and from 
stakeholder to stakeholder.  First, it is important to develop a common vocabulary for the various 




as they share patient information that facilitates patient care.  A key assumption behind this 
section of the study is that healthcare stakeholder risk aversion increases as the cloud deployment 
model selected becomes less controllable by the stakeholder. 
To assist with the comprehension of cloud capabilities and components and to ensure that 
this study was founded on industry standard terminology that can be leveraged for healthcare, 
this research once again relied on credible guidance from NIST.  Specifically, this study 
considered NIST Special Publication 800-145.  NIST created that document to meet regulatory 
requirements under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Public 
Law 107-347.  SP800-145 was created to provide broad comparisons among cloud services and 
deployment approaches and to establish a baseline for discussion on topics ranging from what 
cloud computing is to explanations of various cloud computing deployment options (Mell & 
Grance, 2011).  Understanding the various characteristics of cloud computing and service and 
deployment models is critical for SMBE&A organizations that are seeking to understand and 
assess the risks associated with cloud computing.  By researching cloud-computing models, this 
study also considered the criteria used to select and leverage a risk assessment model. 
Essential cloud characteristics.  Cloud computing provides a model for enabling on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be quickly 
deployed and released with minimal effort and often through self-service capabilities.  As further 
defined by NIST, cloud computing is composed of five essential characteristics, three service 
models, and four deployment models (Mell & Grance, 2011).  An abbreviated version of these 
characteristics and models is depicted at Figure 8.  For a computing environment to be 
considered cloud computing, its environment must include capabilities that are aligned with each 




1. On-demand self-service - A consumer can automatically and unilaterally provision 
computing capabilities, such as server time and network storage, as needed without 
requiring human interaction with each service provider. 
2. Broad network access - Capabilities are available over the network and accessed through 
standard mechanisms that promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client platforms 
(e.g., mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and workstations). 
3. Resource pooling - The provider’s computing resources are pooled to serve multiple 
consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physical and virtual resources 
dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand. Examples of these 
computing resources include storage, processing, memory, and network bandwidth. 
4. Rapid elasticity - Capabilities can be elastically provisioned and released, in some cases 
automatically, to rapidly scale outward and inward, commensurate to demand. 
5. Measured service - Cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource use by 
leveraging a metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the type of 
service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). 
From this list of five essential characteristics for cloud computing, SMBE&A are most 
concerned with characteristics that create a perception of loss of control.  Those characteristics 
include resource pooling or multi-tenant and rapid elasticity.  While these characteristics are 
required to support system scaling, growth, and cost control, they also include risks.  Therefore, 
they are often considered candidate factors for the risk assessment model selection findings 




Cloud service models.  Cloud service models are essentially containers that include a 
predetermined set of IT components that the consumer can “rent” from the cloud provider.  The 
reasons for choosing one model over another vary, but they can include budgetary constraints, 
build versus buy policies, or resource constraints. Standard cloud service models follow. 
 Software as a Service (SaaS) - The capability is provided to the consumer to use the 
provider’s applications as they are running on a cloud infrastructure. The applications are 
accessible from various client devices through either a thin client interface, such as a web 
browser (e.g., web-based email), or a program interface. 
 Platform as a Service (PaaS) - The capability is provided to the consumer to deploy onto 
a cloud infrastructure for consumer-created or acquired applications created using 
programming languages, libraries, services, and tools supported by the provider. 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) - The capability is provided to the consumer to 
provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources 
where the consumer can deploy and run arbitrary software, which may include operating 
systems and applications. 
SMBE&A are less concerned with cloud service models.  The perception of service models is 
that they may provide cost savings.  While this perception may be true in theory, when selecting 
cloud service models, investors must evaluate how service providers are deploying their service 
offerings.  Therefore, these service models were not considered candidate risk factors for the risk 
assessment model that will be presented in Chapter 4. 
Cloud deployment models.  Cloud deployment models are options that encapsulate all 
cloud investments.  The reasons for choosing one model over another often have to do with 




synergistic opportunities across a consumer population, or the need to have a combination of two 
or more of those requirements.  Listed below are NIST’s definitions for each model: 
Private cloud - A cloud infrastructure provisioned for exclusive use by a single 
organization comprising multiple consumers (e.g., business units). 
Community cloud - A cloud infrastructure provisioned for exclusive use by a specific 
community of consumers for organizations that have shared concerns (e.g., mission, 
security requirements, policy, and compliance considerations). 
Public cloud - A cloud infrastructure provisioned for open use by the public. 
Hybrid cloud - A cloud infrastructure composed of two or more distinct cloud 
infrastructures (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities but that are 
bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and 
application portability (e.g., cloud bursting for load balancing between clouds). 
Among this list of four cloud deployment models, SMBE&A are most concerned with 
deployment models that create a perception of loss of control.  The primary concern about cloud 
deployment models is user perceptions of the public cloud.  While this deployment model is 
required to support quick deployment, growth, and cost controls, it also includes inherent risk.  
Therefore, the public cloud deployment model is considered a candidate risk factor in the risk 





Figure 8. NIST capability model for cloud computing. 
Heretofore, a common vocabulary has been developed for the healthcare patient lifecycle, 
HIPAA requirements, and cloud computing models that support covered entities and business 
associates.  The following section considers the research in aggregate with the goal of revealing 
technical risk factors associated with data breaches as related to ePHI being compromised by 
cybercriminals.  For example, technical risk factors related to ePHI include the “at rest” and “in 
transit” states as data are being processed by the SMBE&A population in the cloud.  To 
acknowledge possible points of vulnerability for ePHI in the cloud, it is important to consider the 
standard patient treatment and payment transactions depicted in Figure 7, which includes patient 
information as it travels between a healthcare patient and a SMBE&A population sample. 
As previously assumed, healthcare stakeholder risk aversion increases as the cloud 
capability characteristics and deployment model selected become less controllable by the 
stakeholder.  Less stakeholder control is typically associated with the essential cloud 
characteristics of rapid elasticity and resource pooling/multi-tenancy, as these characteristics can 
be associated with the haphazard expansion or reduction of cloud assets or inadequately 




healthcare stakeholders emerges when a public cloud deployment model is used.  It is generally 
believed that the greatest loss of stakeholder control occurs when public cloud assets are used to 
process confidential information, as a public cloud is often used for rapid and unplanned growth 
scenarios that may be less restrictive and, therefore, less protected (Farahmond, 2010, pp. 1-7). 
Layered Protective Architecture: Defense in Depth Approach   
To select and leverage a risk assessment model that can assist the SMBE&A population 
with assessing the risks associated with ePHI in either the at-rest or in-transit states, this study 
considered additional technical risk factors.  Taking guidance from the HIPAA/NIST crosswalk 
(Table 1) and coupled with the complexities of processing ePHI in disparate cloud deployment 
scenarios (Figure 8), a layered technical architecture should be leveraged to assist SMBE&A 
with the further development of candidate technical risk factors to be used with a selected risk 
assessment model.  In this section of the study, research was conducted on a layered architecture 
framework that assists with the identification of candidate technical risk factors. 
In the U.S., the National Security Agency (NSA) has developed a framework that 
supports a layered protective architecture called Defense in Depth (DiD).  The Information 
Assurance Department (IAD) of the NSA (2015) developed DiD to be a pragmatic framework 
that assists IT security professionals with information assurance initiatives.  The scope of the 
DiD Strategy is balanced across three primary domains (Figure 9), which are People, 







Figure 9. NSA DiD strategy with four key focus areas. 
 People – Effective Information Assurance policies and procedures supported by 
senior executive leadership and followed by the entire organization. 
 Technology – Information Assurance policies, procedures, and architectural direction 
that help to ensure that the most appropriate technology solutions are procured and 
deployed. 
 Operations – Daily activities required to make sure an organization’s security posture 
is sustainable. 
Because cybercriminals exploit targets from multiple points, organizations must deploy 
defensive postures across multiple locations.  As depicted in Figure 9, four foundational focus 
areas should be included in planning for enterprise defensive postures.  Given that the scope of 




that address data encryption and access controls that have been researched here are highlighted in 
red font (Figure 9). 
 Data protection.  With guidance from the OCR/NIST Crosswalk Table (Table 1) and the 
NSA DiD Framework (Figure 9), this study considered research on various data encryption 
requirements and controls that assist with providing data protection measures that include 
confidentiality and integrity for ePHI and Electronic Medical Record (EMR) data this is 
transmitted over distributed networks.  These requirements and controls for data encryption were 
used to help identify encryption methods in DiD that translate well into candidate technical risk 
factors for use with a selected risk assessment model.  To understand specific encryption 
guidance, this study first investigated the Data Security (PR.DS) category of the Protect function 
in the OCR/NIST Crosswalk (Table 1).  In this crosswalk category, “Information and records 
(data) are managed consistent with the organization’s risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information” (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2016). 
Within the PR.DS category, there are subcategories that relate to detailed controls for 
data at rest (PR.DS-1) and data in transit (PR.DS-2).   SC-28 defines data at rest as the state of 
information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems 
(NIST, 2014).  SC-28 offers cryptography to protect ePHI and states that organizations may 
employ different mechanisms to achieve confidentiality and integrity protections, including the 
use of cryptographic mechanisms.  SC-8 defines a data in transit control as applying to both 
internal and external networks and all types of information system components from which 
information can be transmitted.  This control is particularly challenging to implement because 
ePHI and EHR data are often in transit across numerous distributed cloud-based systems as they 




Taking direction from the HIPAA Privacy Rule and protective guidance from DHHS, 
NIST, and NSA to frame a search, this study explored available research on encryption options 
for at-rest and in-transit ePHI.  Cloud service providers Online Tech (2013) describes at-rest and 
in-transit ePHI, respectively, as follows: 
 ePHI data at rest is all electronic personal health information that is not in 
movement on a system, end user device, or storage media;   
 ePHI data in transit is all electronic personal health information that is in 
movement, traveling across integration points either across the Internet or within a 
private network; and 
 encryption for data at rest or in transit can be applied to one or many files. 
Listed below are several encryption deployment options and techniques for both at-rest and in-
transit ePHI (Online Tech, LLC, 2013): 
 Within the subject of ePHI at rest, the concept of authentication refers to encrypted stored 
data that requires users to verify their identity and authenticate to gain access 
(covered in the access controls section). Another key concept of ePHI at-rest is 
data backups. While storing backups at an offsite location is good practice for 
organizations in case of a disaster, data at rest must also be encrypted and secured.  
Following are some common encryption options for ePHI at rest. 
 Full disk encryption (FDE) is the encryption of all data on a hard drive used to boot a 
computer. 
 Database-level encryption is the process of encrypting data as it is written to and read 




 Application-level encryption allows for more granular and custom encryption of data, 
meaning that the application can identify what sensitive data to encrypt and has 
insight into which users have what kind of access. 
Following are common deployment options for ePHI in transit. 
 Virtual Private Network (VPN) – Data are encrypted when sent from one network to 
another; a VPN server then decrypts the data and forwards it to the receiving server. 
 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) – SSL is a cryptographic protocol that can provide 
security as information is transmitted over the Internet.  It should be noted that SSL 
has been replaced with Transport Layer Security (TLS). 
 Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) – SFTP allows for secure file transfers between 
hosts as well as for the access/management of files on remote file systems 
Because all encryption methods listed meet the control guidelines from HIPAA/NIST 
crosswalk subcategories PR.DS-1 (data at rest) and PR.DS-2 (data in transit), all methods are 
candidate technical risk factors that may be used for the risk assessment model selection 
presented in Chapter 4. 
It should be emphasized here that this study focused on controls related to ePHI at rest 
and in transit, namely encryption methods.  However, specific encryption implementation details 
are out of scope for this study. 
Access controls.   With guidance from the OCR/NIST Crosswalk (Table 1) and the NSA 
DiD Framework (Figure 9), this study considered research on various data access control 
approaches that assist with providing confidentiality and integrity for ePHI and EMRs 
transmitted over distributed networks.  These requirements for access controls were used to help 




and may be considered for use with a selected risk assessment model.  To understand specific 
guidance around access controls, this study first investigated the Access Control (PR.AC) 
category of the Protect function in the OCR/NIST Crosswalk (Table 1).   
Within category PR.AC, there are subcategories that address detailed controls for Identity 
Management (PR.AC-1), Remote Access (PR.AC-3), and Least Privilege and Separation of 
Duties (PR.AC-4).  This crosswalk category indicates that “access to assets and associated 
facilities is limited to authorized users, processes, or devices, and to authorized activities and 
transactions” (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2016). 
 Identity Management.  (PR.AC-1) - Identities and credentials are managed for 
authorized devices and users. Two examples of Identity Management include Multi-
Factor Authentication and Authorization.  Role-based Access (RBAC) can be leveraged 
to accomplish authorization. 
 Remote Access. (PR.AC-3) - Remote access is managed as defined in PR.AC-4. 
(Souppaya & Scarfone, 2016, p. 3).  Examples of Remote Access include Virtual 
Private Network (VPN), Remote System Control, and Individual Application Access. 
 Least Privilege and Separation of Duties (LPSD). (PR.AC-4) - Access permissions 
are managed by incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of 
duties.  An example of LPSD is Authorization Provisioning, which can be achieved 
by using a RBAC system approach. 
As recommended by NSA in the DiD framework, it is necessary to defend the computing 
environment that hosts or processes ePHI with multi-factored authentication and role-based 
access controls on hosts, servers, and applications to resist insider, close-in, and distribution 




cybercrime.  Using a password-only (single-factor) approach to authentication is not sufficient, 
as there are numerous password hacking approaches that can easily discover and exploit 
passwords.  At minimum, information security professionals should also include some type of 
biometric or randomly generated digital key to accompany passwords to achieve multi-factor 
authentication.  RBAC enables LPSD capabilities by greatly reducing the possibility of an 
undesirable combination of access permissions that could weaken the security posture for a 
system or application (O'Connor & Loomis, 2010). 
Because all access control methods listed meet control guidelines from the HIPAA/NIST 
crosswalk subcategories PR.AC-1 (identity management), PR.AC-3 (remote access), and 
PR.AC-4 (least privileged access), all methods are potential candidate technical risk factors that 
may be used for the risk assessment model selection findings presented in Chapter 4.  It should 
be emphasized here that this study focused on controls related to access to ePHI: namely, access 
control methods.  However, specific access control implementation details are outside the scope 
of this study. 
Risk Assessment Requirements and Methods 
 Thus far, the literature review for this study has focused on HIPAA requirements for the 
protection of ePHI and a variety of variables that introduce, identify, or mitigate risk related to 
ePHI that is processed in the cloud by the SMBE&A population.  This section of the literature 
review shifts to considerations of risk analysis and management best practices and discusses the 
research conducted for risk assessment models and methods.  David Wagner, CEO of Country 
Risk Solutions (2018), offered the following comments on assessing and managing risk: 
Some risks that we believe are unknown, are not unknown.  With some insight and 




When equipped with the right capabilities, knowledge, and insight, risk variables and 
factors are more visible, which allows us to better assess and manage them. (p. 5) 
Wagner’s thoughts on risk translate well to risk assessment related to ePHI and the 
processes, tools, and variables leveraged for that kind of assessment.  This section used the 
previous literature research in this study to (a) consider risk analysis best practices that align with 
the HIPAA Security Rule and guidance from NIST and (b) research risk assessment models and 
methods that align with HIPAA requirements and guidance from NIST and there were, therefore, 
probable candidates for evaluation by the selection process introduced in Chapter 3. 
HIPAA security rule requirements.  The HIPAA Security Rule requires healthcare 
covered entities and business associates to assess risk and implement appropriate protective 
measures to protect ePHI from becoming compromised (DHHS: Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, 2007).  To further support the Security Rule by providing more specific 
guidance, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) created the HIPAA Security 
Series Papers.  “This publication of papers includes a series of seven studies which all focus on 
specific aspects of the Security Rule” (DHHS: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
2007).  The CMS study focused on the series paper titled “Basics of Risk Analysis and Risk 
Management,” using them as a guide for choosing appropriate risk assessment models and tools.  
The CMS Risk Analysis and Risk Management section of the HIPAA Security Series (2007) 
states that a covered entity must conduct deliberate risk assessments and practice thorough risk 
management to identify and mitigate possible vulnerabilities associated with ePHI. 
While the HIPAA Security Rule does not prescribe specific risk analysis or risk 
management methodologies, the Basics of Risk Analysis and Risk Management paper within the 




Management Guide for Information Technology Systems.  CMS offers steps from NIST SP 800-
30 to provide guidance to covered entities and business associates that are planning for and 
choosing their risk analysis or risk management methodologies.  Those steps form the basis for 
conducting requirements analysis of risk analysis and management.  The following steps 
highlight the key elements of risk analysis: 
1. Identify the scope of the analysis; 
2. gather data; 
3. identify and document potential threats and vulnerabilities; 
4. assess current security measures; 
5. determine the likelihood of threat occurrence; 
6. determine the potential impact of threat occurrence; 
7. determine the level of risk; and 
8. identify security measures and finalize documentation (DHHS: Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2007). 
The risk analysis steps provided by CMS and NIST were used in this study to help 
develop the selection criterion for risk assessment models and capabilities.  Those selection 
criteria were clearly defined and leveraged in a risk management model selection process in the 
methodology chapter (Chapter 3) of this study.  Because the estimation of risk is not an exact 
science, the methodologies used to evaluate risk often mix of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches.  Considering the guidance from OCR (HIPAA Security Rule), CMS, and NIST, this 
study focused research on widely used risk assessment methodologies and tools that rely upon a 
blend of numerical and categorical variables and outcomes to arrive at conclusions about risk 




comprehensive risk management plan and maintaining security measures are outside the scope of 
this research. 
Risk assessment methodologies and capabilities.  There are many options for 
assessing, analyzing, and managing the risks associated with IT assets.  Richard E. Mackey, Jr. 
vice president of consulting at SystemExperts, an information security-services firm, in his 
article titled “Choosing the Right Information Security Risk Assessment Framework,” argued, 
“The heart of a risk assessment framework is an objective, repeatable methodology that gathers 
input regarding business risks, threats, vulnerabilities, and controls and produces a risk 
magnitude that can be discussed, reasoned about, and treated” (Mackey, 2011).  However, risk 
management can easily become an overwhelming undertaking that involves a large investment of 
resources, people, technology, and money. 
Risk management approaches can include everything from high-level qualitative 
assessment to laborious and time consuming quantitative efforts.  A right-sized hybrid approach 
is often a reasonable way forward.  As Whitman and Mattord (2017) explained, the goal of a 
hybrid assessment is to expand on qualitative-only measures without resorting to unconfirmed 
estimations. After further refinement of the scope for risk management capabilities to those 
required for SMBE&A to satisfy the HIPAA Security Rule and to fit within the guidance 
provided by CMS via NIST SP 800-30 R1, this study considered a smaller list of risk assessment 
model options that is easier to comprehend.   
To establish a starting point for the discovery of models and methods, the study 
researched and leveraged the Inventory of Risk Management and Risk Assessment Methods 
provided by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (European 




expertise for cybersecurity in Europe.  Given the complexity of addressing cybersecurity across 
the diverse states of the European Union, this source is appropriate for considering risk 
management methods used worldwide and supports the research goals of this study.  The risk 
assessment methods considered in this research and published by ENISA are as follows:  
 Octave-S v1.0 for SMB’s: The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE®) risk assessment model was developed by the Software 
Engineering Institute of the Carnegie Mellon University.  The U.S. Department of 
Defense first invested in this initiative to address HIPAA security standard compliance 
requirements.  OCTAVE can be customized to the meet the technical and business needs 
of each organization (Gritzalis, Iseppi, Mylonas, & Stavrou, 2018). 
OCTAVE is a self-directed approach, which means that people from an organization 
assume responsibility for setting the organization’s security strategy. The traditional 
OCTAVE method includes three phases, shown in Figure 10.  In phase 1, the analysis 
team identifies important information-related assets and the current protection strategy 
for those assets. The team then determines which of the identified assets are most critical 
to the organization’s success, documents their security requirements, and identifies 
threats that can interfere with meeting those requirements.  In phase 2, the analysis team 
performs an evaluation of the information infrastructure to supplement the threat analysis 
performed in phase 1 and to inform the mitigation decisions in phase 3.  Finally, in phase 
3, the analysis team performs risk identification activities and develops a risk mitigation 





Figure 10. Octave method phases. 
The traditional OCTAVE method was established for medium to larger sized companies 
and, while it is a widely used methodology, it is labor and process intensive and can 
overwhelm a smaller company. 
OCTAVE-S is an alternative form of the original OCTAVE model that is tailored to 
smaller organizations (those with fewer than 100 people) that have limited resources.  
OCTAVE-S is typically led by a small, cross-functional team (of three to five employees) 
that collects and analyzes information to develop a strategy and execution plan that 
addresses the specific needs of the company being evaluated (European Union Agency 
for Network and Information Security [ENISA], 2018).  Another significant feature of 




are embedded in the OCTAVE-S worksheets and guidance, allowing less experienced 
risk and security practitioners to address a broad range of risks with which they may be 
familiar. A final distinguishing feature of OCTAVE-S is that it requires a less extensive 
examination of an organization’s IT infrastructure (Caralli, Stevens, Young, & Wilson, 
2007). 
 ISO/IEC IS 13335-2: An ISO standard describing the complete process of information 
security risk management in a generic manner. The annexes contain examples of 
information security risk assessment approaches as well as lists of possible threats, 
vulnerabilities, and security controls. ISO/IEC IS 13335-2 can be viewed as the basic 
information risk management standard at an international level, one that sets a framework 
for defining the risk management process.  NIST SP 800-30, Revision 1, as previously 
discussed, gives very detailed guidance on identifying what should be considered within 
the realm of computer security risk management and risk assessment. It provides some 
detailed checklists, graphics (including flowchart), and mathematical formulas, as well as 
references that are mainly based on U.S. regulatory issues. 
 Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP): An open community dedicated to 
enabling organizations to conceive of, develop, acquire, operate, and maintain 
applications that can be trusted (Open Web Application Security Project [OWASP], 
2018).  All OWASP tools, documents, forums, and chapters are free and open, making 
them an excellent choice for SMBs with limited resources.  OWASP is governed 
worldwide by their foundational bylaws, core values, and code of ethics, which can all be 




The standard risk model used by OWASP states that [Risk = Likelihood * Impact].  With 
that formula in mind, six steps that comprise the OWASP approach.  In these steps, the 
factors that make up “likelihood” and “impact” are broken down.  An introduction to and 
brief definitions of the six steps are provided below (Open Web Application Security 
Project, 2016). 
1. Identifying a Risk: Identify a risk that needs to be rated.  The attributes of the risk 
being identified should include the threat agent involved, the attack that will be used, 
the vulnerability involved, and the impact of a successful exploit on the business. 
2. Factors for Estimating Likelihood:  This is a rough measure of how likely this 
vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited by an attacker. It is not necessary to be 
over-precise in this estimate. Generally, identifying whether the likelihood is low, 
medium, or high is sufficient. 
3. Factors for Estimating Impact:  The OWASP approach considers two impact 
categories.  The first is the "technical impact" on the application, the data it uses, and 
the functions it provides. The other is the "business impact" on the business and the 
company operating the application. 
4. Determining Severity of the Risk: In this step, the likelihood estimate, and the impact 
estimate are summed to calculate an overall severity for the severity of the risk. 
5. Deciding What to Fix: After the risks to the application have been classified, there 
will be a prioritized list of what to fix. As a rule, the most severe risks should be fixed 
first. It simply does not help the overall risk profile to fix less important risks, even if 




6. Customizing a Risk Rating Model: Having a customizable risk ranking framework for 
a business is critical. A tailored model is much more likely to produce results that 
match perceptions of a serious risk.  This is particularly critical for assessing the risk 
of ePHI where the expectations are clearly spelled out in the HIPAA privacy rule and 
stakeholder perceptions are known. 
Figure 11 illustrates a completed risk rating exercise using the OWASP methodology for 
a typical Network Penetration Test result use case. 
 
Figure 11. OWASP risk ratings for PEN test use case example. 
A supplemental tool that can be used in a supporting role with most risk assessment methods is 
the Security Risk Assessment (SRA) Tool offered by the Office of the National Coordinator for 
Health Information Technology (ONC, in collaboration with OCR and OGC), which is available 
at the HealthIT.gov website.  “The purpose of a risk assessment is to identify conditions where 
Electronic Protected Health Information (ePHI) could be disclosed without proper authorization, 




the questions in the SRA Tool can be used to help with the risk identification, determining the 
severity and customization steps to be taken for the chosen risk assessment methodology.  
Specific uses or experimentation for the SRA Tool is beyond the scope of this study, however. 
Solution Selection Approach 
Decision matrix model.  When SMBE&A are considering a best-fit risk assessment 
model for their organization, they should use a solution selection method that supports fact-based 
decision making.  For this study, a decision matrix approach was used. 
Background.  The American Society for Quality (ASQ) defines a Decision Matrix Model 
(DMM) as a framework that “allows teams to evaluate and prioritize a list of options.  The team 
first establishes a list of weighted criteria and then evaluates each option against those criteria” 
(Tague, 2004).  There are several approaches that can be used to develop and leverage a decision 
matrix.  All those approaches use selection criteria to work towards an optimal solution.  The 
differences in approaches lie in the way that each criterion is evaluated for selection.  The 
simplest way to provide value to each criterion is to use broad, highly subjective ranking, as in 1, 
2, 3 (1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high).  More deliberate and less subjective approaches include 
applying weighted values to each criterion to ensure that the most critical criteria are not 
overlooked, or something like the Pugh matrix can be used to evaluate new options against an 
establish a baseline, which may be one of the alternatives or the current product or service.  With 
this approach, the team compares new options against a known baseline. 
DMM selection and why.  For this study, a weighted criterion approach was selected to 
assist with the evaluation and selection of a risk assessment methodology.  Given an assumption 




an established baseline.  Otherwise, the Pugh matrix (Tague, 2004) approach would have been 
further considered. 
DMM populated with chosen selection criterion.  Table 2 shows the decision matrix that 
was used in this study. It includes the weighted criteria and placeholders listed as options 1-3 that 
were then replaced with evaluated risk assessment methodology options in Chapter 4.  Also, in 
Chapter 4, all risk assessment methodologies were evaluated, and the resulting chosen option 
was presented based on the chosen option being evaluated as the best fit for the SMBE&A 
population, which processes ePHI in the cloud. 
Table 2. Decision matrix template with weighted criteria. 
 
In the DMM example in Table 2, “Business Impact” has been weighted with 5 points, 
showing that the evaluation team, in this example, considers it the most important criterion 
compared to others, which are weighted with values less than 5.  The team also chose an option 
rating scale of high = 3, medium = 2, and low = 1.  For example, in “Option 1,” flexibility is high 
(3) because that solution option is highly customizable.  Option 1 also has a high (3) rating for 
low cost and complexity, as it is free and requires minimal effort to set up and use.  Threat and 
Vulnerability rated low (1) because those risk factors assume that tooling is in place to populate 




that some level of security tooling is in place but not mandatory.  Business Impact is high (3) 
because risk factors can be weighted in favor of business factors when it is known that business 
factors outweigh all other risk factors when assessing risk level. 
Each rating is then multiplied by the weight for that criterion.  For example, “Flexibility” 
(with a weight of 4) for Option 1 rates high (3), yielding a score of 12 (4 x 3).  After all options 
have been evaluated and scored, the scores are then added across the rows to obtain a total score 
for each solution option.  Option 1 has the highest score at 47, which is far higher than the next 
nearest score, which is for Option 3, with a score of 32.  Given the relatively large delta between 
these scores, confidence is increased for Option 1, which has a high likelihood of being a strong 
fit for the business needs identified in this section of the study. 
Other decision matrix considerations. 
 “A very long list of options can first be shortened with a tool such as list reduction or 
multi-voting” (Tague, 2004). 
 “Criteria that are often used fall under the general categories of effectiveness, 
feasibility, capability, cost, time required, support or enthusiasm (of team and of 
others).”   
The following are other commonly used criteria: 
For selecting a problem or an improvement opportunity: 
 Within control of the team; 
 Financial payback; 
 Customer pain caused by the problem; and 
 Urgency of the problem. 




 Root causes addressed by this solution; 
 Time until solution is fully implemented; 
 Cost to maintain (total cost of ownership); and 
 Effect of other systems. 
Summary for Literature Review 
This literature review highlighted the justification for SMBE&A to leverage a viable risk 
assessment model to assist with the identification and reduction of risk for ePHI that is processed 
on the Internet.  To accomplish this, many related subject areas were researched, including 
industry surveys and scholarly research, HIPAA and its regulatory implications for ePHI and 
SMBE&A, awareness of concerns related to some specific cloud characteristics and deployment 
models, vulnerabilities associated with ePHI being processed in the cloud, a layered protective 
architecture discussion required to understand and evaluate technical risk factors related to ePHI 
vulnerabilities, risk assessment models that help to identify and evaluate ePHI vulnerabilities, 
and a solution selection using a decision matrix approach. 
Computer systems that process ePHI transactions are spread throughout the healthcare 
ecosystem and are managed with varying degrees of discipline, capability, cost, and risk.  These 
points, coupled with the mass movement of healthcare information being migrated to various 
cloud hosting and application deployment models, makes ePHI a prime target for cybercriminals.  
This constraint makes it challenging for U.S. healthcare organizations to achieve an ideal patient 
care ecosystem, which requires “the consolidation of patient data for broad and comprehensive 
access (by healthcare providers) that will lead to better patient outcomes, lower costs, and a more 




an open and efficient healthcare system is in direct conflict with regulatory requirements that 
protect ePHI and addresses the pervasive cybercrime that makes those requirements necessary. 
One possible solution to this problem is to ensure that all SMBE&A are using ePHI 
protective capabilities that are HIPAA compliant.  The presence or absence of such capabilities 
can be best discovered through strong risk assessment methods and practices.  The literature 
reviewed in this chapter included several risk assessment frameworks that are likely good 
candidates for the SMBE&A population.  In the next chapter (Chapter 3), a research design is 
leveraged that includes data collection and analysis approaches that help answer research 
questions related to development of selection criteria and are then used to suggest the best risk 




CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, the research approach, design, and data analysis used to address the four 
research questions outlined in Chapter 1 and to analyze associated literature review data from 
Chapter 2 are described and developed.  For example, as shown in the research conducted in 
Chapters 1 and 2, points of view in the U.S. regarding the protection of ePHI clearly include high 
anxiety due to the perceived loss of control associated with hosting and processing ePHI in the 
cloud.  Given that pragmatic responses come forward out of actions, situations, and 
consequences rather than only preceding conditions, a pragmatic research design approach is 
appropriate for this study (Creswell, 2014).  Further, this study is primarily focused on healthcare 
in the U.S., so the research design is refined from a broad pragmatic point of view to address 
specific pragmatic problems in the U.S. healthcare industry. The study employed a pragmatic 
approach that emphasized the research problem and used both qualitative and quantitative 
methods to understand the problem and answer the research questions presented in Chapter 1.  
The key characteristics of pragmatism emphasized in this study include considering the 
consequences of actions, a problem-centered emphasis, and an orientation toward real-world 
practice.  While pragmatism is often associated with mixed methods studies, it is being leveraged 
in this study to support a hybrid research approach that includes components of convergent 
mixed methods and case study approaches: It emphasizes processes, activities, and events. 
As HIPAA regulations require, SMBE&A must remain aware of risk levels for ePHI to 
support risk mitigation and HIPAA compliance efforts (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2017).  
As an industry best practice and with direct guidance from OCR and NIST, impacted SMBE&A 




implement appropriate risk mitigations.  In this chapter, the methodological approaches applied 
are used to develop research design and methods that, in turn, are used to justify the need for risk 
assessment and to select a risk assessment model that is best suited to help SMBE&A to meet 
HIPAA compliance requirements. 
Research Questions 
As described throughout this study’s background, purpose, and literature review, 
SBME&As are at risk of HIPAA data (ePHI) breaches.  Therefore, they require the ability to 
select and leverage an appropriate risk assessment model to be able to assess risks to ePHI that is 
processed within cloud-based systems.  To define and support the research required for this 
study, a research design that includes both qualitative and quantitative data was used.  The areas 
of focus for this design are presented here as the research questions (RQ): 
RQ1:  Does risk of an ePHI breach justify the need to leverage a viable risk assessment 
model for the SMBE&A population? 
RQ2:  Through evaluation and assessment of HIPAA regulatory requirements and 
impacted IT architecture, what are the current risk factors for risk assessment that are 
critical for the SMBE&A population? 
RQ3:  Through evaluation and assessment of current risk models that meet HIPAA risk 
factor needs, what are candidate models for the SMBE&A population? 
RQ4:  What selection decision capability can be used by the SMBE&A population to 
evaluate and select an appropriate risk assessment model and how can the chosen model 
be leveraged to evaluate risk levels? 
The research design for this study used Research Areas (RA1-4) to support resolutions of 




RA1 for RQ1: The research presented in Chapters 1 and 2 regarding Internet growth and 
related vulnerabilities justifies the need to leverage an appropriate risk assessment model 
for SMBE&A. 
RA2 for RQ2: Research presented in Chapter 2 regarding HIPAA regulatory 
requirements and enforcement, along with guidance from NIST and NSA (DiD), 
identifies related characteristics and risk factors that were later used in this study to 
evaluate, select, and utilize an appropriate risk assessment model for the SMBE&A 
population. 
RA3 for RQ3: Research presented in Chapter 2 identifies and evaluates risk assessment 
models that are likely selection candidates for the SMBE&A population. 
RA4 for RQ4:  Research completed and presented in Chapter 2 identifies and 
demonstrates an effective decision matrix process that is later used in this study to 
evaluate and select a risk assessment model that is appropriate for the SMBE&A 
population. 
Research Design 
The key components of this research design are illustrated in Figure 12. They include the 





Figure 12. Research design components. 
To address the research questions and areas of research, a combination of both qualitative 
and quantitative information that gathered from the documents researched were leveraged for 
this study.  The following characteristics are associated with each of these information types: 
 Qualitative Information 
o researcher as a key instrument, 
o holistic account, and 
o reflexivity. 
 Quantitative Information 
o Surveys that include statistical information. 
o Regulatory requirements. 




 Document Analysis (by theme or grouping) 
o Industry surveys, articles, reports, and scholarly research that confirm risks on the 
Internet for SMBE&A. 
o HIPAA regulatory requirements and enforcement. 
o DHHS (OCR) and NIST guidance and best practices. 
o Protective layered architecture framework from NSA, as DiD. 
o Risk assessment requirements and best practices from HIPAA security rules, 
DHHS (OCR), CMS, and NIST. 
o Selection decision support methods. 
o Risk assessment models and methods. 
There are many qualitative and quantitative data points that firmly support the views of 
the participants impacted by the subjects of this research.  The most significant examples of these 
key data points are the many regulatory requirements and impacts from non-compliance 
associated with the protection of ePHI and the question of who is accountable for that protection.  
These data were leveraged to perform an in-depth analysis of cases in which SMBE&A 
organizations with limited resources needed to select a risk assessment methodology and use it to 
determine risk levels for the ePHI that they process when facilitating patient care transactions 
within the cloud. 
Research Participants 
For this study, the researcher was the primary instrument for conducting, analyzing, and 
interpreting the research.  The researcher reflected on how his role and personal background, 
culture, and experiences hold potential for forming his interpretations, such as the themes 





The data collection for this study occurred in three phases. The initial phase consisted of 
research on vulnerabilities related to the rapid growth of IoT, the impact of those vulnerabilities 
on healthcare, specifically ePHI that is processed by SMB healthcare entities in the cloud, and 
the impacts of HIPAA compliance requirements on those healthcare entities.  The second phase 
of data collection included research on risk assessment frameworks and methods that are best 
suited for SMB healthcare entities with limited resources and that process ePHI in the cloud.  
The third phase of data collection used the data collected in Phases One and Two, related to 
HIPAA compliance and best practice guidance from OCR and NIST, to develop a selection 
framework that includes criteria to aid with the selection of a best-fit risk assessment 
methodology for SMB healthcare entities.  The third phase of data collection was conducted with 
framework instruments that included a decision matrix based on chosen selection criterion and a 
deployment example for the selected risk assessment methodology.  For this study, a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative data helped to resolve the research questions. 
Qualitative information.  In the past, researchers “had to discuss the characteristics of 
qualitative research and convince faculty and audiences as to their legitimacy” (Creswell, 2014, 
pp. 201-202).  While these discussions are now less frequent, it is critical to explain who 
participates in qualitative research and why their input is relevant and credible.  The following 
information supports the use of qualitative methods for this study: 
 Researcher as key instrument: The researcher for this study is a key research 
instrument and has over 30 years of experience in the field of Information 
Technology, which includes 20 years in various healthcare IT roles.  In these roles, 




involving dozens of internal and external system integration architectures that are 
directly related to the subject area and problem statement for this study.  These 
initiatives included: 
o Design and implementation of Enterprise Application Integration Hub, such as 
a HIPAA validation engine that processed HIPAA validation of healthcare 
claims for over 3 million insured patients per year; 
o Led architecture requirements for major system conversion from ICD-9 to 
ICD-10 codes – “ICD is International Statistical Classification of Diseases” 
(World Health Organization, 2018); and 
o Led architecture requirements and design for a major system transformation 
with the goal of migrating the company from numerous and disparate on-
premise, large scale mainframe and minicomputer systems to an external 
grouping of cloud-based systems with healthcare applications deployed with 
Software-as-a-Service models; 
o Executive sponsor for a major initiative at SMBE&A to transform external 
integration hub by including more modern and standardized Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs) that business partners can consume with a 
goal of reducing cost, risk, and complexity. 
Toggle Magazine interviewed the researcher as a case study for his work as a CIO in 
the SMBE&A industry (Sulem, 2017).  Given this broad and deep experience with 
healthcare IT, the researcher’s background and experience suggest the credibility of 





 Holistic account and reflexivity:  Researchers who use qualitative data to develop a 
comprehensive view of the problem being studied are said to be approaching their 
research with a holistic account.  Qualitative researchers who use reflexivity to 
research qualitative data leverage documentation, observation of behaviors within the 
studied ecosystem, or interviews with participants in the study.  For this study, 
reflexivity was leveraged by researching industry documents and observing behaviors 
that exist within the patient care ecosystem (Figure 7).  Further information that 
supports using holistic accounts and reflexivity research approaches are described as 
follows. 
o Holistic account: This approach to research involves reporting multiple 
perspectives that arise across the field of study, identifying situational factors 
and explaining the broader picture that surfaces.  For example, in Chapter 1, 
the ongoing increase in risks associated with the convergence of exponential 
growth of IoT and continued concerns over the privacy of personal 
information in the cloud were discussed.  This study further refined the 
investigated population to SMBE&A that participate in patient care and use 
personal healthcare information.  With a focus on SMB healthcare entities that 
have limited resources, this research then uses data around this focus area to 
develop criterion for selecting risk assessment methods. 
o Reflexivity:  The researcher leveraged extensive research and surveys 
conducted in the Cost of Data Breach study by Ponemon (2016), which 
included 383 companies across 12 countries and had 63 U.S. companies 




leads all other global companies surveyed by 49% when considering data 
breaches that result in financial consequences.  The cost of these breaches 
averages $3.97 million per incident and is mostly related to lost business.  
When healthcare-related factors associated with the value of patient data and 
the cost of HIPAA compliance are added, the cost continues to grow.  
Unmistakable evidence for HIPAA violations and HIPAA financial penalty 
settlements exist at the OCR Breach Portal, where researchers can confirm the 
IT assets breached, the number of individuals affected, and the healthcare 
entities involved.  These data directly support the assertion that SMB 
healthcare entities are at a higher risk of exposing their ePHI due to technical 
vulnerabilities.  When considered holistically, these datasets establish a 
foundation that helps to answer the research questions. 
Quantitative information. 
 Surveys and research that include statistical information:  Surveys and scholarly 
research that included quantitative or numeric descriptions of trends were used to 
understand the attitudes and opinions of the healthcare industry regarding the 
vulnerability of ePHI when processed in a cloud by the SMBE&A population. 
 Regulatory requirements:  Research was conducted for this study to determine 
HIPAA requirements and the compliance and non-compliance costs of those 
requirements on SMBE&A.  Further, HIPAA Security Rule requirements coupled 
with protective guidance from NIST and other sources were considered to assist with 
the development of criteria to be used to select an appropriate risk assessment model, 




 Decision-making processes and instrumentation:  A decision-making model was 
selected (a decision matrix) that included weighted numeric values to assist with a 
quantitative selection process for a risk assessment model to be used by the 
SMBE&A population. 
Document analysis. The documents, artifacts, or sources critical to this study are coded 
below and logically grouped by theme, as shown in Table 3. 
o DOCGRP01:  Industry surveys, articles, reports, and scholarly research that 
confirm risks on the Internet for SMBE&A. 
o DOCGRP02:  HIPAA regulatory requirements and enforcement. 
o DOCGRP03:  OCR and NIST guidance and best practices for HIPAA 
compliance. 
o DOCGRP04:  Protective layered architecture framework from NSA, as DiD. 
o DOCGRP05:  Risk assessment requirements and best practices from HIPAA 
Security Rule, DHHS (OCR), CMS, and NIST. 
o DOCGRP06:  Risk assessment models and methods. 


















As discussed in the data source section of Chapter 3, the researcher was the primary 
instrument for research throughout this study.  As a result, data were collected through research 
and experience, as shown in Table 3.  The data used to help answer the research questions were 
based on company and stakeholder surveys conducted across broad industry and geographical 
demographics that were refined to focus on the SMBE&A population in the U.S.  The sources 
for these data included research organizations, analysts, publication authors, technology vendors, 
and scholars.  These data sources include Cisco Systems, Ponemon Institute, IBM, global 
companies concerned with the impacts of data breaches, healthcare covered entities and business 
associates, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), DHHS Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR), Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), National Coordinator for 
Health Information Technology (ONC), Insurance Journals, National Institute of Standards & 
Technology (NIST), and several scholars from a variety of universities and research 
organizations.   
Additional data were based on several layered requirements.  The first was best practices 
and guidance for risk management frameworks and risk assessment and analysis capabilities.  
These data sources included the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 
DHHS Office of Civil Rights (OCR), Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), 
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC), National Institute of Standards 
& Technology (NIST), European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), 
and Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). 
The next set of data cane from DHHS, OCR, CMS, ONC, and NIST, which cooperate to provide 




compliance, and explanations of the consequences that result from non-compliance. Finally, 
NIST, ENISA, and OWASP provide guidance, frameworks, and capabilities that can be used to 
assess ePHI vulnerabilities.  In combination, these data sources were used as inputs for the 
development of a framework that SMB healthcare entities can use to select an appropriate risk 
assessment methodology to implement. 
Data Analysis 
 For this data analysis, seven themes/categories of data (Table 3) were analyzed with the 
goals (a) confirming the assertion that ePHI is at risk when processed by SMB healthcare entities 
with limited resources and in the cloud and (b) using some of that same information to develop 
selection criterion to be used with a decision matrix to evaluate and select a best-fit risk 
assessment methodology.  The sources that were leveraged to conduct this data analysis included 
industry surveys, regulatory publications and statistics, HIPAA compliance guidelines, and 
decision matrix modeling techniques and procedures.  Table 4 lists each research question along 
with the applicable code(s) from Table 3 for the document analysis theme groups as well as a 
data analysis code that matches each research area with the appropriate research question and a 
consolidated definition with explanations and examples, where appropriate. 
Table 4. Data analysis table. 
 
DA-RA1.  This data analysis method addresses RQ1 by considering research presented in 




analysis was done to justify the need to leverage an appropriate risk assessment model for 
SMBE&A.  The data analysis evaluated and crosschecked appropriate data in DOCGRP01 & 02 
to determine if risk related to SMBE&A that process ePHI transactions on cloud-based systems 
can be qualified.  For example, Research from DOCGRP01 & 02 was used to first develop a 
predicted growth rate range for IoT.  Multiple growth rate predictions were compared with 
variables that effected each growth rate to establish a refined range.  More research was 
conducted and analyzed to determine what theoretical percentage of the refined IoT growth rate 
range includes vulnerable devices.  Research was also conducted to determine the likelihood of 
an impact from the rapid growth of IoT on the U.S. healthcare industry on data (ePHI) breaches 
within the SMBE&A population. 
DA-RA2.  This data analysis method addresses RQ2 by considering research presented in 
Chapter 2 regarding HIPAA regulatory requirements and enforcement, along with guidance from 
NIST and NSA (DiD) that helped to identify related characteristics and risk factors that were 
later used in this study to evaluate, select, and utilize an appropriate risk assessment model for 
the SMBE&A population.  The data analysis method conducted for DA-RA2 evaluated and 
cross-checked for appropriate data in DOCGRP02, 03, & 04 to determine the ideal 
characteristics and risk factors later used to create selection criteria for a risk assessment model 
that is a best fit for the SMBE&A population.  For example, the definition of the SMBE&A 
population was established and its participation within the patient care ecosystem was illustrated 
(Figures 3 & 7).  HIPAA regulatory and enforcement variables were also considered, as well as 
guidance for compliance from OCR, NIST, CMS, and NSA.  Selection criteria, characteristics, 




 DA-RA3.  This data analysis method addresses RQ3 by considering research presented in 
Chapter 2 that identified and evaluated those risk assessment models that are likely selection 
candidates for the SMBE&A population.  The data analysis method conducted for DA-RA3 
evaluated and crosschecked appropriate data in DOCGRP05 & 06 to determine a top three 
candidate list of risk assessment models that are likely good fits for the SMBE&A population.  
For example, research at the ENISA website and other sources revealed three selection 
candidates that are all aligned with at least multiple selection criteria (identified at DA-RA2).  
The top-three candidate list included Octave-S v1.0, ISO/IEC IS 13335-2, and Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) Framework. 
 DA-RA4.  This data analysis method addressed RQ4 by considering research presented 
in Chapter 2 that identified and demonstrated an effective decision matrix process that was later 
used in this study to evaluate and select a risk assessment model that is appropriate for the 
SMBE&A population.  Further, the selected risk assessment model was tested with an example 
to illustrate its use by the SMBE&A population.  The data analysis method conducted for DA-
RA4 used data in DOCGRP07 to select a method and develop a decision matrix that was later 
used to select a best-fit risk assessment model from the top three candidate models that were 
identified in DA-RA3.  The selected risk assessment model was then configured with the risk 
factors that were developed in DA-RA2.  Further, a test risk assessment was completed with the 
configured model to provide an example of how the selected model can be used by the 






From the six key elements for ethical research set out in the ESRC Framework for 
Research Ethics (Economic and Social Research Council [ESRC], 2018), elements one, two, and 
six are relevant for this study: 
 Element One - Research should be designed, reviewed, and undertaken to ensure integrity 
and quality.  How did the researcher ensure quality and integrity for this study? 
o Answer One – The researcher ensured quality and integrity by using data from 
reputable sources and cross-checking them with similar sources. 
 Element Two - Research staff and subjects must be fully informed about the purpose, 
methods, and intended possible uses of the research, what their participation in the 
research entails, and what risks, if any, are involved. Some variation is allowed in 
specific and exceptional research contexts for which detailed guidance is provided in the 
policy guidelines.  Can the researcher ensure that any potential participants will be fully 
informed of the purpose, methods, and intended possible uses of the research? 
o Answer Two – As the researcher was the primary instrument for this study, the 
only other participants were indirectly involved as members of the thesis 
committee.  All committee members were fully informed of the purpose, methods, 
and intended possible uses of the research. 
 Element Six - The independence of the research must be clear, and any conflicts of 
interest or partiality must be made explicit.  Will the research design enable the 





o Answer Six – This study was conducted independently and did not raise or 
involve any conflicts of interest. 
Summary of the Methodology 
 In this chapter, the philosophical worldview used in this study was introduced as 
pragmatism.  The worldview was then refined to address points of view about ePHI 
vulnerabilities within the U.S. healthcare industry.  Pragmatism was chosen because this study 
was based on actions, situations, and consequences related to vulnerabilities with ePHI processed 
by SMB healthcare entities with limited resources to protect patient information within cloud-
based IT systems.  This chapter also considered the various aspects of a hybrid qualitative and 
quantitative research design that was used for this study and included data collection and analysis 




CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
Introduction 
The intention and objectives of this exploratory inquiry were to identify, assess, and 
reduce risks associated with the protection of ePHI that is processed in the cloud by SMB 
healthcare stakeholders and to do so in a way that is HIPAA compliant.  The healthcare 
population studied for this research was a variety of healthcare covered entities and business 
associates (SMBE&A) involved a simple patient care scenario, as introduced in Chapter 2, that 
leverage various cloud-based resources. 
Data collection for this hybrid qualitative and quantitative study occurred in three phases, 
with the initial phase consisting of research on vulnerabilities related to rapid growth of IoT and 
the impact of those vulnerabilities on ePHI that is processed by SMB healthcare entities in the 
cloud as related to HIPAA compliance requirements.  The second phase of data collection 
included research on risk assessment frameworks and methods best suited to SMB healthcare 
entities with limited resources that process ePHI in the cloud.  The third phase of data collection 
used the data collected in Phases One and Two, related to HIPAA compliance and best practice 
guidance from OCR and NIST, to develop a selection framework that includes selection criteria 
to aid with the selection of a best-fit risk assessment methodology for SMB healthcare entities.  
The third phase of data collection produced with framework instruments that include a decision 
matrix based on chosen selection criterion and an example deployed for the selected risk 
assessment methodology.  For this study, the combined qualitative and quantitative data help to 
answer our research questions, which were introduced in Chapter 1: 
RQ1: Does the risk of an ePHI breach justify the need to leverage a viable risk 
assessment model for the SMBE&A population?
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RQ2: Through evaluation and assessment of HIPAA regulatory requirements and 
impacted IT architecture, what are the current risk factors for risk assessment that are 
critical for the SMBE&A population? 
RQ3: Through evaluation and assessment of current risk models that meet HIPAA risk 
factor needs, what are candidate models for the SMBE&A population? 
RQ4: What selection decision capability can be used by the SMBE&A population to 
evaluate and select an appropriate risk assessment model and how can the chosen model 
be leveraged to evaluate risk levels? 
Interpretation 
The results of the foregoing research are interpreted in this chapter through the thematic 
development of each research area.   
Validity 
Both the qualitative and quantitative data from surveys, statistics, case studies, and other 
evidence were verified and validated in this chapter through a thematic verification for each 
research area.  For example, the research results from this study were used to connect and 
validate the qualitative data from surveys and use cases with quantified facts from scholarly 
research and breach investigations at the OCR HIPAA violations portal. According to Creswell 
(2014), “Validity is one of the strengths of qualitative research and is based on determining 
whether the findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant, or the 
readers of an account” (p. 201).  Creswell also stated that “researchers must actively incorporate 
validity strategies into their thesis” (p. 201).  There are eight primary strategies used to validate 




 Triangulate different data sources of information by examining evidence from the sources 
and using it to build a coherent justification; 
 use a rich, thick description to convey the findings, transport readers to the setting, and 
provide a discussion an element of shared experiences; and 
 clarify the bias the researcher brings to the study to create an open and honest narrative 
that resonates with readers. 
Results of Data Analysis 
This section summarizes the analysis procedures used in this study to answer the research 
questions. Each research question is analyzed, and the results are given below in the form of 
research area narrative, themes, and theme verification. 
DA-RA1.  This data analysis addressed RQ1 by considering research presented in 
Chapters 1 and 2 (DOCGRP01 & 02) regarding rapid Internet growth and related vulnerabilities. 
This analysis was done to justify the need to leverage an appropriate risk assessment model for 
SMBE&A.  The data analysis method included evaluating and cross-checking appropriate data in 
DOCGRP01 & 02 to determine if risk related to SMBE&A that process ePHI transactions on 
cloud-based systems can be qualified and quantified.  RQ1 is resolved in this section of the study 
through thematic verification as follows. 
Thematic development.  When an aggregate view that included all data being analyzed 
for DA-RA1 was considered, themes that answered RQ1 developed.  Those themes are as 
follows: 
The impact of rapid IoT growth and unprotected IoT devices:  When a rapid annual 
growth rate of 25% for IoT devices (Figure 1) is combined with a device vulnerability 




breaches through unprotected IoT devices.  We can no longer suggest that vulnerable 
devices on the Internet are rare. The time-series plot in Figure 13 shows that in 2017 
there were over 28 billion IoT devices, of which 7.7 billion were vulnerable. 
 
Figure 13. IoT vulnerable devices with 27% growth rate. 
Risks and impacts associated with data breaches on the Internet:  At 49% of global costs 
due to loss of business resulting from data breaches, the U.S. spent an average of $3.97 
million per incident (Ponemon Institute, LLC, 2016).  Contributors to the loss of business 
in the U.S. included loss of business reputation, costs of notification, and regulatory 
penalties.  These data suggest that consumer perceptions of data privacy are clear drivers 
in the U.S of costs related to the loss of business that results from data breaches. 
Impacts of data breaches resulting from HIPAA non-compliance:  At $380 per capita, 




across sixteen standard U.S. industry categories (Ponemon Institute, LLC, 2016).  At 
99.7%, SMB’s represent a large majority of U.S. companies.  However, if the average 
annual HIPAA settlement cost is $16M and all one hundred twenty-three covered entities 
under investigation are found to be non-compliant and to have had financial penalties 
enforced, that results in an average non-compliance cost of $133,000 (DHHS Office for 
Civil Rights [OCR], 2018).  This indicates that HIPAA compliance costs are not a 
primary contributor to cost of data breaches in the healthcare industry. 
Thematic verification.  Positions revealed through thematic development were validated 
by understanding the relationships among statistical information. 
 Cisco Systems predicted that, given its current rate of annual growth (25%), IoT will 
grow to 50 billion devices by 2020 (Afshar, 2017; Cisco 2013). 
 Gartner, Inc., Hewlett-Packard, and IDC published more conservative predictions that 
would put IoT at 20-30 billion devices by 2020 (Gartner, Inc., 2015; IDC, 2017). 
 The actual IoT growth rate lies in the hands of the consumers that drive IoT usage 
patterns.  The more extreme IoT growth prediction of 50 billion devices by 2020 
includes dependencies (Kranz, 2018) that will be catalysts for rapid IoT growth (25% 
annual growth rate).  The combined research in DOCGRP01 & 02 suggested that 
there is an aggressive advancement of these dependencies, which could cause the 
more extreme growth prediction range to come to fruition. The dependencies include 
the following: 
o Artificial Intelligence (AI) will facilitate much faster IoT device onboarding; 
o Fog or Edge Computing is required for extreme IoT growth to be successful, 




o blockchain is a basic requirement for highly regulated industries such as 
healthcare and finance. 
The impact of rapid IoT growth on unprotected IoT devices: 
 To validate the assumption that the IoT vulnerable device growth rate is 27%, the 
following data from DOCGRP01 & 02 were considered. 
o Number of devices on IoT in 2017: n = 28.4 billion; 
o Mean vulnerability rate:  m = 27%; 
 SCADA Devices Scanned = .44%; 
 Traffic Control Devices Scanned = 40%; 
 Printers Scanned = 41%; 
o number of vulnerable devices scanned by Symantec every 2 minutes: = 7.7 
billion.  
The 27% growth rate for vulnerable IoT devices is depicted alongside general IoT growth rate in 
Figure 13. 
Risks and impacts associated with data breaches on the Internet: 
 Global increase in the total cost of data breaches since 2013 = 29%; 
 U.S. increase in total cost of data breaches from 2014-2016 = 9%; and 
 U.S. loss of business cost = $3.97 million per incident = 49% of global cost. 
Impacts of data breaches resulting from HIPAA non-compliance: 
 If 99.7% of U.S. companies are SMBs and 62% of those SMB companies are data 
breach victims, with 20% of those victims representing healthcare, then we can 




 The 2017 Average HIPAA settlements cost of $16.4m / 123 possible entities fined 
equals $133,000 in cost per entity.  This is evidence that financial penalties resulting 
from HIPAA non-compliance are not key contributors to loss of business for 
SMBE&A.  Rather the reputational impacts, which include loss of business or other 
financial burdens, such as mitigation required to become compliant or correction from 
reputational damage, are the key sources of these losses. 
Summary.  When combined, the themes and the theme verification for DA-RA1 suggest 
that healthcare SMBs are at high risk of HIPAA data (ePHI) breaches and therefore must be 
equipped to assess and evaluate their company’s risk levels with an appropriate risk assessment 
methodology and capability. 
DA-RA2.  This data analysis addresses RQ2 by considering research presented in 
Chapter 2 regarding HIPAA regulatory requirements and enforcement, along with guidance from 
NIST and NSA (DiD) that helped to identify related characteristics and risk factors used later in 
this study to select and utilize an appropriate risk assessment model for the SMBE&A 
population.  The data analysis method conducted for DA-RA2 involved evaluating and cross-
checked appropriate data in DOCGRP02, 03, & 04 to determine the ideal characteristics and risk 
factors used to create selection criteria for a risk assessment model that is a best fit for the 
SMBE&A population.  RQ2 is resolved in this section of the study through a series of research 
area (RA2) themes and thematic verifications, as follows. 
Thematic development.  When an aggregate view that included all data being analyzed 
for DA-RA2 was considered, the following themes developed that answered RQ2:  
Risk assessment requirements and capabilities: The research in Chapter 2 revealed that 




to HIPAA’s privacy and security rules with the primary goal of “ensuring the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information 
(ePHI) that covered healthcare entities and their business associates create, receive, 
maintain, or transmit” (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2016, p. 3).  Also revealed in 
Chapter 2 was that the “HIPAA Security Rule (HSR) requires health care providers, 
health plans, and business associates to conduct risk analyses and implement technical, 
physical, and administrative safeguards for ePHI (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2016, 
p. 5).”  One of the key HSR requirements that we are concerned with for this study is the 
requirement that all covered entities and business associates conduct risk analyses.  Our 
research in this area revealed that CMS developed the HIPAA Security Series Papers, 
which included a paper focused on risk management called “Basics of Risk Analysis and 
Risk Management.” This document aimed to connect HSR requirements with the risk 
assessment and management best practices published by NIST in SP 800-30.  Because 
our selection criteria were only concerned with risk analysis capabilities, we included 
only the example risk analysis steps offered by CMS and NIST to help define our risk 
analysis capability selection criteria. 
Development of selection criteria:  Risk assessment model and capabilities should 
include specific assessment characteristics that are aligned with the needs of healthcare 
SMB entities that wish to understand their current risk posture regarding HIPAA non-
compliance.  Categories for these assessment characteristics include HSR requirements, 
SMB requirements, ability to estimate the likelihood of a breach, and ability to estimate 




Thematic verification.  Positions revealed through thematic development were verified 
and validated through evaluation of HIPAA regulatory requirements and impacted IT 
architectures.  In addition, data were verified that were used to develop the final criteria for the 
selection of an appropriate risk assessment model for the SMBE&A population. 
Risk assessment requirements and capabilities:  The selection criteria should assist 
SMBE&A with the selection of a risk analysis model (RAM).  Consultations that 
supported the development of the selection criterion included guidance from OCR and 
NIST per their crosswalk table (Table 1) and from the capabilities defined by CMS and 
NIST to facilitate risk analysis steps.  A fully refined version of the OCR/NIST crosswalk 
table that was used to develop RAM selection criteria is provided in Table 5.  Further, the 
standard risk analysis steps provided by CMS and NIST are provided as an additional  
Table 5. OCR/NIST crosswalk table (fully-refined). 
 
resource to support further development of selection criteria for a RAM that is best suited 
to the SMBE&A population: 
1. Identify the scope of the analysis, 
2. gather data, 




4. assess current security measures, 
5. determine the likelihood of threat occurrence, 
6. determine the potential impact of threat occurrence, 
7. determine the level of risk, and 
8. identify security measures and finalize documentation. 
Development of selection criteria:  The risk evaluation categories defined in Chapter 3 
are used here to complete the development of selection criteria to be used within a chosen 
selection process or model, as defined in RA3.  The final selection criteria are categorized 
and detailed as follows: 
 HIPAA Security Rule Requirements (Business Needs and Impact) 
Model flexibility – Risk assessment model must be flexible; consumers can customize 
and give high value to the impact of HIPAA non-compliance issues. 
 SMB Characteristics 
Low Cost – Most SMB healthcare organizations that process ePHI have limited    
resources to invest in high-cost risk assessment solutions. 
Low Complexity - Most SMB healthcare organizations that process ePHI have limited 
resources and skillsets required to effectively use and manage medium-to-highly 
complex risk assessment solutions. 
 Estimating Likelihood 
Threat – considers the worst-case threat agent, such as a hacker that is targeting 
specific data exploit opportunities. 
Vulnerability - Assuming a worst-case threat agent as the culprit, estimate the 




 Estimating Impact 
Technical Impact - To discover the depth and breadth of system or data impacts, 
technical impacts are considered to assess confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
accountability. 
Business Impact – Consider the impact of system or data breaches on business 
operations, financial stability, reputation, and compliance concerns. 
 Risk Assessment Capability Guidance 
Regulatory Alignment – Most closely aligns with HIPAA Security Rule requirements 
and OCR/NIST guidance. 
Summary.  When combined, the themes and theme verification for DA-RA2 confirm the 
risk factors and selection criteria that were used in DA-RA3 to identify a top-three candidate list 
for risk assessment models that align with the needs of SMBE&A.  Further, the selection criteria 
verified in DA-RA2 were used with a decision matrix model to evaluate and select the top three 
candidate risk assessment models. 
DA-RA3.  This data analysis addressed RQ3 by considering research presented in 
Chapter 2 that identified and evaluated those risk assessment models that are likely selection 
candidates for the SMBE&A population.  The data analysis method conducted for DA-RA3 
evaluated and crosschecked appropriate data in DOCGRP05 & 06 to determine a top three 
candidate list of risk assessment models that are likely good fits for the SMBE&A population.  
RQ3 is resolved in this section of the study through the following series of research area (RA3) 
themes and thematic verifications: 
Thematic development.  When an aggregate view that included all data being analyzed 




Risk assessment requirements and capabilities:  Research in Chapter 2 revealed that the 
“HIPAA Security Rule (HSR) requires health care providers, health plans, and business 
associates to conduct risk analyses and implement technical, physical, and administrative 
safeguards for ePHI” (DHHS: Office of Civil Rights, 2016, p. 5). The key HSR 
requirement that we have been concerned with in this study is the requirement that all 
covered entities and business associates conduct risk analyses.  Our research in this area 
revealed that CMS developed the HIPAA Security Series Papers, which included a paper 
specifically focused on risk management called “Basics of Risk Analysis and Risk 
Management.” This document aimed to connect HSR requirements with the risk 
assessment and management best practices published by NIST in SP 800-30.  Its best 
practice guidance was leveraged in DA-RA3 to assist with discovering the top-three risk 
assessment models. 
Broad characteristics considered when selecting candidate risk assessment models:  As 
noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the SMBE&A population often has limited resources and 
knowledge required to identify and assess risks associated with ePHI vulnerabilities on 
cloud-based systems.  Therefore, broad characteristics to consider when selecting 
candidate models include low cost, low complexity, easy access, and easy learning and 
deployment. 
Thematic verification.  Positions revealed through thematic development were verified 
and validated through the evaluation of current risk models that align with the following HIPAA 
risk factor and selection criteria: 
Risk assessment requirements and capabilities:  To establish a starting point for the 




Risk Management and Risk Assessment Methods provided by the European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security (European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security [ENISA], 2018).  ENISA is a center of expertise for cyber security 
in Europe.  Due to the complexity of addressing cybersecurity across the diverse states of 
the European Union, this source was appropriate for considering the risk management 
methods used worldwide, and it also supports the research goals as they relate to HIPAA 
requirements.  Risk assessment methods considered in this research and published by 
ENISA are as follows: 
 Octave-S v1.0 for SMB’s: The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE®) risk assessment model (Figure 10) was 
developed by the Software Engineering Institute of the Carnegie Mellon 
University.  The U.S. Department of Defense first invested in this initiative to 
address HIPAA security standard compliance requirements. 
 ISO/IEC IS 13335-2: An ISO standard describing the complete process of 
information security Risk Management in a generic manner. The annexes contain 
examples of information security risk assessment approaches as well as lists of 
possible threats, vulnerabilities, and security controls. 
 Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP): An open community 
dedicated to enabling organizations to conceive of, develop, acquire, operate, and 
maintain applications that can be trusted (Open Web Application Security Project 
[OWASP], 2018). 




 Octave-S v1.0 for SMB’s:  The U.S. Department of Defense was an early adopter 
of OCTAVE, which is used to address HIPAA compliance requirements.  Octave-
S is a subset of its traditional form and is tailored to fit smaller the business needs 
of smaller companies (less than 100 employees) (Caralli, Stevens, Young, & 
Wilson, 2007).  While Octave-S appears to be available at no charge, it is 
“process-and-artifact-heavy,” and its implementation information is dated 
(Alberts, Dorofee, Stevens, & Woody, 2005, p. 4). 
 ISO/IEC IS 13335-2 can be understood as the basic information risk management 
standard at an international level, setting a framework for the definition of the risk 
management process. As previously discussed in this research, NIST SP 800-30, 
Revision 1 gives detailed guidance on identifying what should be considered 
within computer security risk management and risk assessment.  Due to its broad 
use to address regulatory concerns, it is likely a good fit to address HIPAA 
requirements.  However, it is a “process-and-artifact-heavy” solution intended for 
larger organizations. 
 Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP):  All OWASP tools, 
documents, forums, and chapters are free and open, making them an excellent 
choice for SMBs with limited resources.  OWASP is governed worldwide by their 
foundational bylaws, core values, and code of ethics, which can all be reviewed at 
the OWASP website.  The website includes templates and instructions (Petrak, 





Summary.  When combined, the theme verification for DA-RA3 used the risk factors and 
selection criteria defined in DA-RA2 to identify a top three candidate list for risk assessment 
models that likely align with the needs of SMBE&A.  All three of these candidate models align 
with HIPAA requirements and NIST guidelines.  Further, all three candidate models align with 
one or more broad characteristics, which include low cost, low complexity, easy access, and ease 
with which the model can be learned and deployed. 
DA-RA4.  This data analysis addresses RQ4 by considering the research presented in 
Chapter 2 (DOCGRP07) that identified and demonstrated an effective decision matrix process 
that was used in this section of the study to evaluate and select a risk assessment model 
appropriate to the SMBE&A population.  Further, the selected risk assessment model is provided 
as an example to illustrate possible use by the SMBE&A population.  RQ4 is resolved in this 
section of the study through the following series of research area (RA4) themes and thematic 
verifications. 
Thematic development.  When an aggregate view that included all data being analyzed 
for DA-RA4 was considered, the following themes that answered RQ4 developed: 
Using a decision matrix model as a decision support capability:  The American Society 
for Quality (ASQ) has defined a Decision Matrix Model (DMM) as a framework that 
“allows teams to evaluate and prioritize a list of options.  The team first establishes a list 
of weighted criteria and then evaluates each option against those criteria” (Tague, 2004). 
DMM populated with study-relevant and weighted criteria to support selection of risk 
assessment model:  The simplest way to provide value to each criterion is to use broad, 
highly subjective ranking, as in 1, 2, 3 (1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high).  More deliberate 




ensure that the most critical criteria are not over looked, or else something like the Pugh 
matrix can be used to evaluate new options against an established baseline, which may be 
one of the alternatives to the current product or service.  For this study, our assumption 
was that SMBE&A are new to risk assessments and have not established a baseline.  
While this study did use weighted criteria, it did not include an established baseline. 
Using DMM to select a risk assessment model:  The decision matrix was populated using 
selection criteria that were developed throughout Chapter 2 and refined at DA-RA2 in 
Chapter 4. 
Guiding by example with completed risk assessment, using selected model:  After a risk 
assessment model was selected, a basic risk assessment was completed to illustrate its 
possible uses for the SMBE&A population. 
Thematic verification.  Positions revealed through thematic development were verified 
and validated in this section by illustrating the use of a DMM model to evaluate and select a 
best-fit risk assessment model for SMBE&A.  Once a risk assessment model was selected, an 
example implementation of that chosen model was also provided. 
Using a decision matrix model (DMM) as a decision support capability:  A DMM was 
used to support the selection of a risk assessment model.  A DMM template, illustrated in 
Table 6, is used in the following manner. 
 Criteria are added along with their weighted values (W) across the top row. 
 For each criteria-option combination, a rank (R) of 1-3 is input (3 = highest 
alignment, 2 = medium alignment, and 1 = low alignment). 
 Multiply the R and W values for each criteria-option combination, (R x W) = 




combinations, add the combination scores for each solution option and input the 
total in the appropriate score total cell. 
Table 6. Decision matrix template. 
 
DMM populated with study-relevant criteria to support selection of risk assessment 
model:  A list of risk factors and weighted criteria was established at DA-RA2 to be used 
with the DMM template and to support the selection of a risk assessment model. 
Using DMM to select a risk assessment model:  The list of risk factors and weighted 
criteria were added to the DMM template, the solution options were ranked and scored, 












Table 7. Completed DMM for risk assessment model selection. 
 
Given the observations made during the research conducted in Chapter 2 and the results 
of the data analysis for DA-RA3, each solution option was ranked and scored, as follows: 
 OCTAVE-S: (1) Flexibility – moderate with some customization possible; (2) 
Cost & Complexity – free, but moderately complex to implement; (3) Threat & 
Vulnerability – Moderate capability to setup this risk factor; (4) Technical Impact 
– Moderate capability to setup this risk factor; (5) Business Impact - Moderate 
capability to set up this risk factor. 
 ISO/IEC 13335-2: (1) Flexibility – no customization possible; (2) Cost & 
Complexity – Moderate cost and difficult to implement; (3) Threat & 
Vulnerability – Strong capability to setup this risk factor; (4) Technical Impact – 
strong capability to set up this risk factor; (5) Business Impact – Weak capability 
to set up this risk factor. 
 OWASP: (1) Flexibility – Highly customizable; (2) Cost & Complexity – free, 




setup this risk factor; (4) Technical Impact – Moderate capability to setup this risk 
factor; (5) Business Impact – Strong capability to setup this risk factor. 
Guiding by example with completed risk assessment using selected model:  As the 
OWASP risk assessment model was selected, this study offered an example case for use 
of the model.  The goal was to guide the SMBE&A population by example to encourage 
adoption of the model.  The combination of Tables 8, 9, & 10 provides an example of a 
completed OWASP risk assessment for a patient care scenario, as depicted in Figure 7. 
Table 8. Likelihood scores for OWASP example. 
 










Table 10. Overall risk severity level for OWASP example. 
 
In the OWASP risk assessment example provided in Tables 8, 9, and 10, the following 
observations can be made. 
 Overall likelihood rating – This rating was determined by evaluating all risk 
factors within the threat and vulnerability categories. 
 Overall impact rating – This rating was determined by evaluating all impact 
factors within the technical and business impact categories. 
 Overall risk severity level – For this example, the following observation was 
made: 
o The overall likelihood score was 5.5, which is considered a medium risk 
level by OWASP standards. 
o The overall impact score was 6.3, which is considered a high-risk level by 
OWASP standards. 
o When combined, the average for those risk levels is 5.9, which is 
considered a medium risk level by OWASP standards.  However, because 
it is risk assessment best practice to give business risk priority over 
technical risk, the risk level has been rounded up to 6.0, which makes the 
overall risk severity level high.  This is particularly important for this 




compliance with HIPAA and privacy violation (ePHI at high risk of 
becoming compromised). 
Summary.  This data analysis addressed RQ4 by considering research presented in 
Chapter 2 (DOCGRP07) that identified and demonstrated an effective decision matrix process, 
which was used in this section of the study to evaluate and select a risk assessment model most 
appropriate for the SMBE&A population.  Due to its flexibility, low cost and low complexity, 
and alignment to HIPAA requirements, the OWASP risk assessment model was selected.  
Further, the OWASP model was tested to illustrate its possible use for the SMBE&A population.  
RQ4 was resolved in this section of the study through a series of research area (RA4) themes and 
thematic verification. 
Overall Results 
With the data analysis themes herein revealed and verified, all four research questions 
have been answered and resolved. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the results for all research 
analyses with the goal of revealing implications and recommendations for future research as well 
as for drawing conclusions. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of Results and Discussion 
 In this chapter, a final summary of each of the four research areas is discussed to explain 
the implications of the results, to describe what gaps exist in current research, as to provide 
recommendations for future research.   
Research Area One (RA1).  To answer RQ1, this research area (RA1) included data 
analysis on the impact of vulnerabilities resulting from rapid IoT growth on ePHI data being 
processed by SMBE&A on cloud-based systems.  Multiple data sources (DOCGRP01 & 02) 
were studied and crosschecked to determine if the risk level justified the need for SMBE&A to 
leverage a viable risk assessment model.  The answer found was affirmative.  Given recent 
increases in Internet usage patterns (Kranz, 2018), the Internet will continue to grow at a rate of 
25% annually (Afshar, 2017), with vulnerabilities representing 27% of that growth.  The study 
also found that healthcare patient records (ePHI) being processed by the SMBE&A population 
have the highest likelihood of being compromised and at the highest cost (Ponemon Institute, 
LLC, 2016).  Given the clear target of ePHI by cybercriminals and the vulnerabilities of IoT, the 
SMBE&A population must leverage a viable risk assessment model to identify risk and 
determine severity levels so that they can plan for the mitigation of those risks. 
Research Area Two (RA2).  To answer RQ2, Research Area 2 (RA2) included research 
and data analysis on the characteristics of and risk factors related to HIPAA regulatory 
requirements (DHHS: Office for Civil Rights, 2013) and compliance guidance from NIST 
(NIST: Joint Task Force for Transformation Inititative, 2012) and the NSA (National Security 
Agency, 2015). These were later used to evaluate, select, and provide an implementation 




accomplish this, many data sources (DOCGRP02, 03, & 04) were studied and crosschecked to 
determine which characteristics and risk factors were leveraged (DA-RA2).  Those 
characteristics and risk factors were used to develop selection criteria that were later used to 
evaluate, select, and implement a risk assessment model for DA-RA3 and DA-RA4. 
Research Area Three (RA3). 
To answer RQ3, Research Area 3 (RA3) included research and data analysis (DOCGRP05 & 06) 
on risk assessment models that are likely selection candidates for the SMBE&A population.  
Using the criteria developed for DA-RA2, the following top-three candidate list was discovered 
and presented: OCTAVE-S, ISO/IEC IS 13335-2, and OWASP.  Those selection candidates 
were further evaluated in RA4 to determine the best fit for the SMBE&A population. 
Research Area Four (RA4). 
To answer RQ4, Research Area (RA4) included research and data analysis (DOCGRP07) that 
identified, selected, and leveraged a selection decision support capability called a decision 
matrix.  That decision matrix was then used to evaluate, score, and select a best fit risk 
assessment model for the SMBE&A population (DA-RA4).  OWASP was selected based on its 
flexibility (highly customizable), low cost (free), low complexity (easy to access and 
implement), and strong ability to configure for and evaluate risk factors that included threat and 
vulnerability factors (to determine the likelihood of exploitation) and technical and business 
impacts (to determine the impact of exploitation) (Open Web Application Security Project, 
2016).  Further, the OWASP model was configured and explained by example with the goal of 





The findings of this study contributed knowledge to the field of information security, the 
healthcare industry, and the combined industry of Health IT (HIT).  More specifically, as 62% of 
cyber-breach victims are SMB companies, SMBE&A with limited resources should leverage this 
research to assess risk severity levels for the ePHI data that they process, and this can be 
achieved with low effort, at low cost, with low complexity, and with high flexibility.  These 
findings were enabled through the capture and analysis of industry surveys, industry statistics, 
existing scholarly research and analysis, HIPAA requirements for the protection of ePHI, 
information security best practices and guidance from NIST and NSA, and the risk assessment 
framework and rating practices from the OWASP. 
While the benefits and contributions to healthcare IT from this research are many, the 
researcher did observe some gaps.  For example, many SMBE&A are very small. Those in start-
up status have very limited IT or financial resources and may not even be aware of their 
responsibilities when processing ePHI.  Where do these companies go for help?  How will they 
know if they need help?  Another gap is the wide variation in how SMBE&A integrate and 
exchange information with one another.  If these companies cannot account for the successful 
delivery of ePHI transaction payloads, how can they ensure that data privacy and integrity have 
been accomplished?  As explained in the recommendations section of this chapter, there are also 
many emerging regulations and protective capabilities on the horizon that must be considered.  





Recommendations for Future Research 
As indicated in the implications section of this chapter, several gaps that need to be considered 
going forward.  This section will suggest recommendations for addressing those gaps. 
 Recommendation one.  For SMBE&A that have limited IT or financial resources, 
research could be conducted that considers maturation opportunities for these companies in the 
field of healthcare IT and information security in the context of HIPPA compliance.  Like the 
way that the crosswalk table was implemented, OCR and NIST could further their work to 
include compliance “starter kits,” along with assessments, tests, and certifications that result in 
full compliance for SMBE&A organizations.  Research should also be conducted to determine 
the feasibility of including the OWASP risk assessment framework in the compliance starter kit.  
Further, SMBE&A with a record of accomplishment in compliance certification could become 
integration hubs of excellence that help to set standards for less mature entities.  Along with 
compliance, these companies can benefit from consolidation of otherwise disparate transaction 
processing, improving their industry footprint as a certified healthcare integrator as a result. 
 Recommendation two.  Related to recommendation one, future research should consider 
improvements in API standardization and management for SMBE&A.  While APIs have been in 
use for many years, the variations with which APIs are deployed are very broad.  This variation 
in approach will be further expanded because of the rapid the IoT growth discussed throughout 
this study.  According to Gartner analysts, “the cost of application integration is approximately 
30% more than the cost of the applications being integrated” (O'Neill, Malinverno, & Biscotti, 
2017, p. 3).  Much of this cost is due to poor integration techniques and integration 
implementations that must be rebuilt because of improper initial builds.  The Gartner analysts 




apps and multi-grained back-end services that communicate via APIs” (O'Neill, Malinverno, & 
Biscotti, 2017, p 4).  The Garter study proposed that a forum be created to help facilitate API 
standardization and management as well as centers of integration excellence for SMBE&A. 
 Recommendation three.  With emerging regulatory requirements like GDPR, all global 
companies are at risk of severe financial penalties or loss of business because of non-compliance.  
“GDPR” stands for General Data Protection Regulation and seeks to create a data protection 
regulatory framework across the European Union (EU) with the goal of returning control of 
personal data to citizens.  GDPR requirements are not unique to only the EU; strict rules will be 
imposed on those hosting and processing these personal data anywhere in the world.  For 
example, global companies that process any data that belongs to an EU citizen are required to 
“implement appropriate technical and organizational measures, by May 25th, 2018” (Yelland, 
2017, p. 2).  While many U.S. companies may feel that they are immune to this EU regulation, 
global U.S. companies are absolutely in scope, and it is only a matter of time before similar 
regulations will be implemented in the U.S.  With U.S. healthcare becoming even more 
expensive because of cybercrime, this kind of regulatory change is inevitable.  All U.S. 
companies––small, medium, and large––should start preparing now.  Many emerging 
capabilities will likely expand the risk mitigation options associated with breaches of ePHI data.  
For example, more extensive research and testing should be conducted on using capabilities like 
Blockchain, IDPS, DLP systems that leverage AI capabilities, and Cyber Insurance.  In 
combination, research on and advancement of these protective capabilities could provide more 
automated and predictive protective capabilities and reduce the strain on resource-constrained 





According to the research in this study and many others, as well as the nightly news, the 
probability of data breaches is high.  This study investigated how to best assess risks related to 
ePHI data that is processed in the cloud.  More specifically, this study conducted research on 
reducing risk for SMBE&A that process ePHI data in the cloud.  Using a hybrid research design, 
we used qualitative and quantitative data to answer research questions related to justification for 
the research, developing a common understanding of the characteristics of vulnerability for ePHI 
data, and risk assessment options that can be leveraged to aid with HIPAA compliance.  We then 
leveraged that research to answer additional research questions around determining risk severity 
levels for ePHI transactions that originate within the SMBE&A population.  However, it was 
observed that SMBE&A must consider all related factors when evaluating risk, which are 
sometimes ancillary and not obvious.  In the case of our OWASP implementation example, the 
outlier risk severity level of high was due to the high-risk ratings for business impact factors 
related to HIPAA non-compliance and privacy breaches (i.e., a high risk of ePHI data becoming 
compromised).  A breach of this type would likely result in significant financial, reputational, 
and compliance issues.  Therefore, this study found that SMBE&A personnel cannot analyze 
ePHI transactions in isolation. 
The research throughout this study produced numerous examples of both qualitative and 
quantitative information that clearly and consistently justified our need to conduct deeper 
research to support identifying and assessing risks associated with ePHI vulnerabilities on cloud-
based assets and when SMBE&A are liable.  The information that supported the reliability and 
validity for the answers to the research questions in this study included industry surveys, case 




and examples that have been published and endorsed by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. 
As discussed in the “Recommendations for Future Research” section of this chapter, 
there are many emerging opportunities to improve the ways that we assess and mitigate the risks 
associated with ePHI.  Those opportunities range from improvements in HIPAA compliance 
guidelines from OCR and NIST with a focus on compliance starter kits for SMBE&A with 
limited resources to leveraging emerging capabilities such as Blockchain, IDPS, and DLP 
systems that use AI capabilities and Cyber Insurance. Since cybercrime is here to stay, it will be 
critical to remain focused on the protection of ePHI and all confidential information as it moves 




Afshar, V. (2017). Cisco: Enterprises Are Leading The Internet of Things Innovation. Chicago: 
Huffington Post: Huffpost News. 
Alberts, C., Dorofee, A., Stevens, J., & Woody, C. (2005). OCTAVE®-S Implementation Guide, 
Version 1.0. In C. Alberts, A. Dorofee, J. Stevens, & C. Woody, Volume 1: Introduction 
to OCTAVE-S (pp. 5-6, 8). Pittsburgh: Carnagie Mellon: Software Engineering Institute. 
American Medical Association. (2018, March 21). HIPAA Violations & Enforcement. Retrieved 
from AMA Practice Management: HIPAA Compliance: https://www.ama-
assn.org/practice-management/hipaa-violations-enforcement 
Caralli, R. A., Stevens, J. F., Young, L. R., & Wilson, W. R. (2007). Introducing OCTAVE 
Allegro: Improving the Information Security Risk Assessment Process. Pittsburgh: 
Carnegie Mellon: Software Engineering Institute. 
Cisco Systems, Inc. (2015). Fog Computing and the Internet of Things: Extend the Cloud to 
Where the Things Are. San Jose: Cisco Systems, Inc. 
Compliancy Group. (2018, February 14). HIPAA Fines Listed by Year. Retrieved from 
Compliancy Group: https://compliancy-group.com/hipaa-fines-directory-year/ 
Covey, S. (1989). The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People. New York: Touchstone. 
Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research Questions and Hypotheses. In J. W. Creswell, Research 
Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (p. 148). London: 
SAGE Publications, Inc. 
DHHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR). (2018, January 1). Cases Currently Under Investigation. 




DHHS Office for Civil Rights. (2013, July 26). Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Retrieved 
from HHS.gov: Health Information Privacy: https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html 
DHHS Office for Civil Rights. (2017, June 16). Covered Entities and Business Associates. 
Retrieved from HHS.gov: Health Information Privacy: https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/covered-entities/index.html 
DHHS: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2007, March 1). Basics of Security Risk 
Analysis and Risk Management. Retrieved from DHHS CMS: HIPAA Security Series: 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/riska
ssessment.pdf 
DHHS: Office for Civil Rights. (2016, February 23). Addressing Gaps in Cybersecurity: OCR 
Releases Crosswalk Between HIPAA Security Rule and NIST Cybersecurity Framework. 
Retrieved from HHS.gov: Health Information Privacy: https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/security/nist-security-hipaa-crosswalk/index.html 
DHHS: ONC. (2014, March 30). The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology (ONC). Retrieved from healthit.gov: 
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/risk_assessment_user_guide_final_3_26_2014
.pdf 
Donlon, R. (2015, May 27). Small, mid-sized businesses hit by 62% of all cyber attacks: Bad 
news: Financial services, including insurance, is on the most vulnerable list. Property 




Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). (2018, June 16). Key Ethics Principles. 
Retrieved from The Research Ethics Guidebook: A Resource for Social Scientists: 
http://ethicsguidebook.ac.uk/Key-ethics-principles-15 
EDI Basics. (2018, January 30). EDI Resources: HIPAA. Retrieved from EDI Basics: Your 
Resource for Learning About EDI: https://www.edibasics.com/edi-resources/document-
standards/hipaa/ 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). (2018, March 23). 
Inventory of Risk Management / Risk Assessment Methods . Retrieved from ENISA: 
RM/RA Methods: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/threat-risk-management/risk-
management/current-risk/risk-management-inventory/rm-ra-methods 
Farahmond, F. (2010). Risk Perception and Trust in Cloud. ISACA Journal, 1-7. 
Gartner, Inc. (2015). Gartner Says 6.4 Billion Connected "Things" Will Be in Use in 2016, Up 30 
Percent From 2015. Stamford: Gartner, Inc. 
Gartner, Inc. (2018, March 21). IT Glossary: Small and Midsize Business (SMB). Retrieved from 
Gartner: https://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/smbs-small-and-midsize-businesses/ 
Gritzalis, D., Iseppi, G., Mylonas, A., & Stavrou, V. (2018). Exiting the Risk Assessment Maze: 
A Meta-Survey. Association for Computing Machinery: ACM Computing Surveys, 1-28. 
HealthInsurance.org. (2018, March 21). What is an explanation of benefits? Retrieved from 
Glossary: Explanation of Benefits: 
https://www.healthinsurance.org/glossary/explanation-of-benefits/ 
Humer, C., & Finkle, J. (2014, September 24). Healthcare Firms at Risk; Hackers Value Medical 




IDC. (2017). Prepare for Billions: The IoT 2020 IT Infrastructure Readiness Indicator. 
Framingham: International Data Corporation (IDC). 
JA, A. (2015). Hackers Selling Healthcare Data in the Black Market. Chicago: Infosec Institute. 
Jones, E. (2014, September 1). HIPAA "Protected Health Information": What Does PHI 
Include? Retrieved from HIPAA.com: https://www.hipaa.com/hipaa-protected-health-
information-what-does-phi-include/ 
Kranz, M. (2018, January 25). The Internet of Things: 5 Predictions for 2018. Retrieved from 
Cisco Blogs: https://blogs.cisco.com/innovation/the-internet-of-things-5-predictions-for-
2018 
Mackey, R. E. (2011). Choosing the right information security risk assessment framework. 
Newton: TechTarget. 
Megas, K., Piccarreta, B., & O'Rourke, D. G. (2017). Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity 
Colloquium. A NIST Workshop Proceedings (p. 3). Gaithersburg: National Institute of 
Standards and Technology. 
Mell, P., & Grance, T. (2011, September 1). The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing: SP 800-
145. Retrieved from NIST: Computer Security Resource Center: 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-145.pdf 
Merriam-Webster, Incorporated. (2108). Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Springfield: Merriam-
Webster. 
National Security Agency. (2015, July 16). Defense in Depth. Retrieved from Information 





Newman, D. (2017, September 26). Top 10 Trends For Digital Transformation In 2018. 
Retrieved from Forbes: CMO Network: #Getting Buzz: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2017/09/26/top-10-trends-for-digital-
transformation-in-2018/#3f5e0e52293a 
NIST. (2014). Protection of Information at Rest. NIST SP: Security and Privacy Controls for 
Federal Information Systems and Organizations, F-203. 
NIST: Joint Task Force for Transformation Inititative. (2012). Guide for Conducting Risk 
Assessments: SP 800-30, R1. Gaithersburg: National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. 
O'Connor, A. C., & Loomis, R. J. (2010). 2010 Economic Analysis of Role-Based Access 
Control. Gaithersburg: NIST and Research Triangle Institute. 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR). (2003, May 1). Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Retrieved 
from United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS): 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf 
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC), DHHS Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR), & DHHS Office of the General Counsel (OGC). (2017, March 13). 
HealthIT.gov. Retrieved from Security Risk Assessment: 
https://www.healthit.gov/topic/privacy-security-and-hipaa/security-risk-assessment 
O'Neill, M., Malinverno, P., & Biscotti, F. (2017). Emerging Technology Analysis: Full Life 
Cycle API Management. Stamford: Gartner Research. 
Online Tech, LLC. (2013). Encryption of Cloud Data. Ann Arbor: Online Tech, LLC. 
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). (2018, January 22). Welcome to OWASP. 




Open Web Application Security Project. (2016, May 30). OWASP Risk Rating Methodology. 
Retrieved from owasp.org: 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology 
Patterson, S. M. (2017, April 25). 4 reasons Cisco's IoT forecast is right, and 2 why it's wrong. 
NetworkWorld: IoT Connected Intelligences, pp. 1-4. 
Patton, M., Gross, E., Chinn, R., Forbis, S., Walker, L., & Chen, H. (2014). Uninvited 
Connections: A Study of Vulnerable Devices on the Internet of Things (IoT). IEEE 
Computer Society, IEEE Joint Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (pp. 232-
235). The Hague: IEEE. 
Pemberton-Levy, H. (2016). The CIO's Guide to Blockchain. Stamford: Gartner, Inc. 
Petrak, H. (2015, May 31). OWASP Risk Rating Template (Excel format). Retrieved from 
OWASP: 
https://www.owasp.org/images/5/5b/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Template_Example.xlsx 
Ponemon Institute, LLC. (2016). 2016 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis. Traverse 
City: Ponemon Institute: Research Reports. 
Rice, C. (2002, September 8). CNN LAte Addition with Wolf Blitzer. (W. Blitzer, Interviewer) 
Robichau, B. P. (2014). Healthcare Information Privacy and Security: Regulatory Compliance 
and Data Security in the Age of Electronic Health Records. Berkley: Apress. 
Souppaya, M., & Scarfone, K. (2016). User's Guide to Telework and Bring Your Own Device 
(BYOD) Security. Gaithersburg: NIST. 
Sulem, M. (2017, December 21). Brett Luna - Healthesystems: Get Back to Work. Retrieved 





Symantec Security Response. (2016). IoT devices being increasingly used for DDoS attacks: 
Malware is infesting a growing number of IoT devices, but their owners may be 
completely unaware of it. Sunnyvale: Symantec Corporation. 
Tague, N. R. (2004). Decision Matrix. In N. R. Tague, The Quality Toolbox, Second Edition (pp. 
219-223). Milwaukee: American Society for Quality, Quality Press. 
The Consumer Goods Forum; Capgemini; Intel. (2016). Making the Connection: How the 
Internet of Things Engages Consumers and Benefits Business. Santa Clara: Intel 
Corporation. 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2018, May 31). Combating Cyber Crime. 
Retrieved from Homeland Security: Cybersecurity: 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/combating-cyber-crime 
Wagner, D. (2018, January 14). Goodreads Author: Daniel Wagner. Retrieved from Goodreads: 
https://www.goodreads.com/author/show/15463683.Daniel_Wagner 
Westerman, G., Bonnet, D., & McAfee, A. (2014). The Nine Elements of Digital 
Transformation. MIT Sloan Management Review, 1-3. 
Whitman, M. E., & Mattord, H. J. (2017). Risk Management: Controlling Risk. In M. E. 
Whitman, & H. J. Mattord, Management of Information Security (p. 308). Boston: 
Cengage Learning. 
World Health Organization. (2018, February 23). Classification of Diseases (ICD). Retrieved 
from who.int: http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ 




Yilmaz, K. (2013). Comparison of quantitative and qualitative research traditions: 
Epistemological, theoretical, and methodological differences. European Journal of 
Education, 311-325. 
 
 
 
 
